



# ***Daily Report***

## **Sub-Saharan Africa**

FBIS-AFR-93-057  
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# Daily Report

## Sub-Saharan Africa

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### Cameroon

#### Security Forces, Demonstrators Clash in Bamenda

AB2503190793 Yaounde CRTV Radio Network in English 1800 GMT 25 Mar 93

[Text] Two people are reported dead and 16 others hospitalized at the Bamenda Provincial Hospital following clashes between the forces of law and order and protesters demonstrating as part of the Union for Change's plan of action.

The victims were shot around (Ngouem). Hospital sources say those in hospital are badly in need of blood. The governor of the Northwest Province, when contacted, could not comment on the situation. He said he was still to meet with his aides to review the situation at 1800 today, that is, about an hour ago, while all activities in Bamenda are said to have come to a standstill.

A similar clash between the forces and demonstrators occurred in Yaounde this morning. One person was shot on the shoulder.

#### Government Issues Communique

AB2503210693 Yaounde CRTV Radio Network in French 1900 GMT 25 Mar 93

[Government communique issued on 25 March]

[Text] This cast opens with a government communique on the situation in Bamenda. The government announces on 25 March that in (Ngouem) [as heard]—a Bamenda suburb—an isolated group of assailants armed with guns [words indistinct], and pistols, attacked security forces firing 12-gauge shells. The security forces fired back in self defense. The incident left two people dead and 16 wounded, including three assailants, who sustained serious injuries. A police vehicle was damaged and four people were arrested.

Thanks to the outstanding behavior, wisdom, and patriotism of Cameroonians, calm and peace prevail everywhere else in the country despite certain political parties, including the radical opposition's call on the population to rebel. The government strongly denounces these barbaric acts and those who committed them. It once again calls on the population to remain calm and confirms its determination to maintain law and order in every legal way possible.

#### Communications Minister Previews 'Grand Debate'

AB2503173593 Yaounde CRTV Radio Network in French 1900 GMT 23 Mar 93

[("Official statement" issued in Yaounde on 23 March on convening a broad-based national debate—read by Augustin Kontchou Kouomegni, government spokesman and minister of state for communications; recorded]

[Text] Representatives of media houses, I thank you. Ladies and gentlemen of the press, both local and foreign, I thank you most warmly for responding so massively to the invitation which the prime minister and head of government extended yesterday via communique.

On this exceptionally important occasion, our duty in the presence of this delegation of ministers representing the entire government is to announce to you, on behalf of the head of state, for a faithful conveyance to the national and international community, that the national grand debate—promised by His Excellency Paul Biya during the recent electioneering campaign, and particularly during the ceremony at which he was sworn in as president of the Republic—will take place very soon. It will determine the constitutional reforms that will give our country a more modern, democratic, and efficient institutional framework. It will take place during April and May.

The nature of this debate, to which the head of state is now putting the finishing touches, will give every Cameroonian, wherever they may be and whatever their social rank or socioprofessional group, an equal opportunity to take part and make their effective contribution. This will hold more particularly for all legally recognized political parties.

In keeping with the fundamental and practically sacred social order for which he stands and which has constantly been endorsed by plebiscite, the head of state has decided that the national sovereignty of the Cameroonian people, as well as national sovereignty and unity, will be scrupulously safeguarded from beginning to end during this consultation according to the universal principles of democracy. Thus, the final decision of this vast consultation involving the entire nation—which will consecrate the new Constitution of the Republic—will be made by the people themselves through [words indistinct].

The date for the beginning of the deliberations as well as the detailed practical modalities for their conduct will be published shortly. Cameroon will, in this manner, embark on a crucial phase of its democratic process whose successes, despite the (?precarious whirlwinds), make it appear in an Africa tormented and torn apart in some areas as an example, if not a model, increasingly watched with very keen interest worldwide. We do not rule out holding another debate—simultaneously, later, or soon after this one—on the economic, social, and cultural crisis and recovery.

Ladies and gentlemen, communication professionals, in thanking you once more for your faithful presence and your kind attention, my wish is that you give this exceptional message from the head of state the widest publicity in the sense of honoring the motherland and the greatest national concord. Do not forget that what Cameroon needs most today is peace and dialogue so as to succeed in an exemplary manner its march toward greater democracy and prosperity. This is the message that I had to convey to you. Thank you for your kind attention.

**Chad****Armed Opposition Group Reports Government 'Genocide'**

*AB2503211193 Paris AFP in English 1646 GMT  
25 Mar 93*

[Excerpts] Bangui, March 25 (AFP)—An armed opposition group from Chad alleged Thursday [25 March] that government troops were carrying out genocide in southern Chad, and urged international pressure on President Idriss Deby to halt the massacres.

The Peace and Democracy Committee of Moise Kette, some of whose officials have taken refuge here in the Central African Republic, said people were being killed in cold blood by Deby's republican guard and an Islamic legion recruited in Sudan, with "hundreds of villages entirely destroyed and grainstores torched."

A statement issued to the press said that on March 16, the military killed 26 people at Bebo, "opening fire with heavy weaponry and rockets as villagers were still in bed." [passage omitted]

Another armed Chadian opposition group, the Movement for Democracy and Development which operates in the Lake Chad region, meanwhile announced a surprise change in policy.

In a statement issued in Lagos, Nigeria, it said it would comply with decisions reached by a national conference on Chad's future which opened in the capital Ndjamena in mid-January without the movement being allowed to take part.

The movement had previously dismissed the conference's chances of achieving anything significant, because it was packed with government participants. MDD executive secretary Adoum Abdoulaye Hassan said the armed group now regarded the national conference as "a model for the Chadian people."

**Rwanda****RPF Claims Government Cease-Fire Violations**

*EA2503212293 (Clandestine) Radio Muhabura in  
Kinyarwanda to Rwanda 1715 GMT 25 Mar 93*

[Text] At a time when peace talks between the Rwandan Government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front [RPF] are successfully progressing, Rwandan Government troops on their side [words indistinct] 25 March, the Rwandan Government troops attacked the communes of (Kire) and Mukarange and even (Nyabishyanzo) in the Byumba area of the war zone. In their provocation the government troops used heavy artillery, including recoilless

rifles and machine guns, as well as 82-mm and 76-mm [as heard] mortars. The violation of the cease-fire should be condemned by all as it could bring about a bad atmosphere in the current talks in which all Rwandans have invested so much hope, especially the war-displaced.

**Zaire****HCR Approves Tshisekedi Cabinet List**

*AB2603135293 Paris AFP in French 1050 GMT  
26 Mar 93*

[Text] Kinshasa, 26 Mar (AFP)—Zaire's High Council of the Republic [HCR]—the legislative body of the transition—early this morning approved the "reshuffled and expanded" cabinet list submitted to it on 22 March by Mr. Etienne Tshisekedi, authoritative sources at the HCR have announced.

An authorized spokesman told the AFP that the list had earlier been examined by an "ad hoc" commission composed of three councillors for each region—that is, 33 people. That commission said that the list conformed with the criteria for political and regional balance that had been set by the HCR.

He pointed out that the HCR did not have "power" to induct that government and that its debate, described as "heated," centered on ensuring the respect of the criteria for political and regional balance.

Mr. Etienne Tshisekedi was dismissed from his job on 6 February by Zairian President Marshal Mobutu Sese Seko, but the HCR still considers him the prime minister. On 22 March, he presented a "reshuffled" Cabinet list which the HCR has been asking him to do since 13 January.

Various personalities, political party leaders, and two former ministers of the 80's—Messrs Joseph Nsinga Odju and Jules Sambwa—are among the ministers. Two portfolios have been allocated to the Popular Movement of the Revolution (former sole party) and two others to the presidential camp. The remaining posts went mainly to the radical opposition and the civil society.

Also, Mr. Faustin Birindwa, who was appointed prime minister-designate in charge of forming a Cabinet of "expanded national union and public salvation" by the political conclave which was held from 9 through 19 March in Kinshasa upon the initiative of the Presidency of the Republic, yesterday completed his consultations and might announce the list of his government in the next few days, according to informed political circles.

**Police Commissioner Releases 10-Point Plan**

*MB2603050593 Johannesburg SAPA in English 2005  
GMT 25 Mar 93*

[SAPA PR wire service issued by the South African Police Commissioner General Johan van der Merwe in Pretoria on 25 March]

[Text] The current security situation has made it necessary for the South African Police [SAP] to maximize existing means and to introduce an innovative and resourceful strategy to combat crime and violence.

Although the South African Police will do everything within its power to combat crime and violence, it is also vital that the community—regardless of political affiliation—must actively assist us in attaining this objective.

The South African Police has therefore formulated a comprehensive 10-point plan aimed at combining the full resources of the South African Police, other departments and the community in combating crime.

I hereby announce this plan and make an urgent appeal to the community to assist us as far as possible in order to realize the successful implementation thereof. The success of this plan will depend largely on the active support which we will receive from the community.

The 10-point plan, with which we have already commenced, and which we hope to fully implement as soon as possible, entails, in short the following:

- increase in the visibility and presence of the South African Police;
- new initiatives in order to utilize the efficient application of the manpower resources of the community;
- more effective utilization of the security forces for community protection and the combating of crime;
- additional support to farmers for farm protection;
- more effective combating of the following illegal practices: importation, use, distribution, dealing in and possession of weapons/ammunition/explosive devices;
- further steps to combat violence;
- more scientific management of crime-information and co-ordination;
- more effective co-operation between the Departments of Justice, Correctional Services and the South African Police;
- more effective functioning of law enforcement/administration of justice; and
- more effective application of the mechanisms which have been established in terms of the National Peace Accord.

Detailed information regarding this 10-point plan follows.

**Objective 1 Increase in the Visibility and Presence of the South African Police**

In addition to the fact that police visibility definitely prevents crime, it is a known fact that the South African population is currently experiencing an unprecedented state of fear regarding crime victimisation. In order to

increase the visibility of the police, and to lower the fear of crime by means of a police presence, the following steps will be carried out with immediate effect:

- radio-control vehicles and caravans will be utilized as mobile contact-/reporting-points;
- non-static portable reporting-points will be used in business areas;
- public-address systems in patrol vehicles for the broadcasting of crime-prevention hints;
- saturation patrols (quick deployment and continual moving of foot-patrols) in high-crime areas;
- regular cordoning-off and search operations in high-crime areas in co-operation with the South African Defence Force and local municipal law-enforcers;
- the capability of the air wing of the South African Police is to be increased by purchasing a further 7 fixed-wing aircraft, 3 helicopters and 4 Leo observation systems as well as 4 high-technology night-observation systems. The latter will be placed in the Cape Town, Pretoria, Durban and Johannesburg regions; and
- the Leo observation system (the so-called "eye in the sky") will also be decentralized to the western Cape, eastern Cape, Orange Free State, Witwatersrand and Natal regions.

**Objective 2 New Initiatives in Order To Utilize the Efficient Application of the Manpower Resources of the Community**

The South African Police realizes that it cannot effectively combat crime single-handedly. Community-supported policing is the new driving force for the South African Police. This style concentrates on the optimal utilization of all manpower resources within communities. Specific tasks are now being carried out in order to obtain active community involvement and support for policing methods.

2.1 The Reserve Police Force:

- Expansion of the Reservist Corps: The existing reservist corps is being expanded drastically as a result of the fact that members of the Commandos are being recruited for this corps. Urgent attention is being given to certain aspects such as compensation to reservists for exceptional services rendered, and arming them whilst off-duty.
- New Management Model With Regard to the Utilisation of Reservists: Reservists are going to be utilized according to a new model which has been successfully proven on a worldwide basis. The so-called block-watch which exists within own residential areas will be restructured. Block-watches will, on the initiative of reservists (as an extension of the local police station) mobilise residents on a voluntary basis in a suburban context in order to support each other as active

participants, to render help, supply information and to communicate with each other regarding aspects which relate to mutual security. The South African Police will play an important role in supplying the infra-structure. Each member of the South African Police will, as a member of the block-watch, make a concerted effort to render a contribution to his/her block-watch.

**2.2 Neighbourhood Watches:** Although the neighbourhood watch system has developed into an established practice over the last five years, the success thereof is not satisfactory. The upgrading and expansion of the system requires concerted police action which will enable it to develop to its full potential. The following steps will be taken:

- Redefinition of neighbourhood watches and their utilization. This implies, inter alia, their active participation in foot-patrols, briefing with regard to crime tendencies and legal powers, and regular report-backs in connection with information and requirements of neighbourhood watches.
- Implementation of the mechanisms in order to facilitate continuous liaison between community police officer (CPO) and neighbourhood watches.
- Restructuring of neighbourhood watches into blocks. This means that a block-manager must be appointed who will organize duties in co-operation with the CPO, exercise command and control, recruit members in own suburbs, and utilize aids optimally;
- and - The South African Police will play a fundamental role in the effective functioning of the system.

**2.3 Farm and Plot Watches:** In order to enable farm and plot watches to function in a comprehensive and planned manner, the following steps will be taken:

- All farms within a station area concerned will be divided into functional blocks. The protection of occupants will be carried out in accordance with a functional plan, which will be drawn up by the South African Police and the particular block-manager.

**2.4 Formal Co-operation Strategy Between Organized Trade and Industry and the South African Police:** The astronomical proportion of crime in business is causing serious damage to South African trade and industry. Even though co-operation between the South African Police and organised trade and industry, already exists, it is necessary to carry out further steps which are directed towards the combating of opportunistic crimes:

- the establishment of a national management board between the South African Police and organized trade and industry.
- establishment of regional, district and area crime-prevention committees.
- the establishment of improved community-information networks in order to collect crime-information.
- the development of mutual strategies for the optimum utilization of manpower.
- the integration of technological networks of co-ordination, liaison and support of both parties during crime-prevention activities.

**2.5 Business Watches:** Although business watches have been operating successfully for a considerable period of time, the following steps must be taken in order to improve efficiency:

- Restructuring of business watches with more police involvement. This implies the re-allocation of existing business blocks, the appointment of business watch leaders, the appointment of the South African Police co-ordinators and the compilation of work procedures. It

is also necessary to establish a crime-information structure between business watches and the South African Police.

#### **Objective 3 More Effective Utilization of the Security Forces for Community-Protection and the Combating of Crime**

Whilst the protection of the community is one of the prime responsibilities of a modern state, it is logical that such a state will utilize all possible resources in order to attain these objectives. This responsibility cannot, in the current South African context, rest on the South African Police alone. In order to utilize all the resources of the state effectively, actual and urgent steps are being taken in order to realize the following:

- Section 3 (5)(c) of the Defence Act has been amended in order to enable the South African Defence Force to assist the South African Police in crime-prevention;
- The signing of a co-operation agreement between the South African Police and the South African Defence Force is currently receiving attention. The South African Defence Force will, for example, be utilized periodically in a support capacity at road-blocks, cordonning-off, searches, vehicle and foot-patrols and observation duties;
- and - Bi-monthly full-scale national crime-prevention operations for continuous periods of fourteen days will be launched during the coming weeks with the co-operation of the South African Defence Force.

#### **Objective 4 Additional Support to Farmers for Farm Protection**

Attacks on farmers are reaching unacceptable proportions. Not only the government, but the South African Police in particular, is also placed in a poor light. These crimes lead to an upsurge in emotions which can possibly develop into dangerous reprisals. It has therefore become necessary that actual steps be taken in order to protect farms. It is impossible, in a vast rural country such as South Africa, for a police force to be continuously physically involved in the protection of farms. In order to bridge these problems, the following steps are to be implemented:

- The distribution of information to farmers with regard to farm security and relevant legal aspects.
- Briefings to farmers unions and farm watches with regard to self-defence, protection of property, a system of recording details of employees, contingency and communication planning.
- The introduction of an advice service to farmers via the South African Agricultural Union (SAAU) and other relevant organisations with regard to protection measures, for example, high-mast lighting, radio-communication, alarm systems and security fencing;
- and - Investigations are urgently under way into methods and procedures for the subsidising of farmers with regard to improved farm security which include the following:
- alarm systems;
- fencing; and
- communication (Marnet and Citizen Force radios).

**Objective 5 More Effective Combating of the Illegal Importation, Use, Distribution, Dealing in and Possession of Weapons / Ammunition / Explosive Devices**

The illegal possession of weapons, ammunition and explosive devices is currently one of the most distressing crime tendencies in South Africa. In order to assist the police in addressing this tendency, it is necessary to carry out the following steps without delay: - The extension of a comprehensive information network and the further expansion of specialist investigation units on weapons-smuggling routes. - Increased focus on international co-operation and agreements in order to address the question of illegal weapons and ammunition. - The revision of legislation in order to make provision for suspicions with regard to dealing in weapons, and to increase sentences. - The granting of amnesty, in order to give the community the opportunity to hand in illegal weapons. - The improvement of border control by means of the expansion of the searching capabilities at border posts and the imposition of additional patrols. - The establishment of contact point along the borders of neighbouring countries.

**Objective 6 Further Steps To Combat Violence**

Further specific initiatives are being taken in order to combat crime in the so-called "red areas": by means of the distribution of the manpower of the Internal Stability Division. Units are being established in northern Natal (to strengthen manpower at Empangeni and Glencoe) and at Alrode (to serve Katlehong, Thokoza and Vosloorus). In addition to this, members will be placed on farms under threat of cowardly attacks by APLA [Azanian People's Liberation Army] members.

In order to identify factors which increase the incidence of crime, and to identify the needs of the community, the sub-council of the police board has been approached in order to conduct independent investigations in this regard. The results of these investigations will be utilized during the revision of the strategic plan of the South African Police in order to formulate a total strategy to address the problem of violence.

In order to continually remain up to date with regard to policing requirements and problems of the community at grass-roots level, community consultative committees are continually being established as widely as possible on a local level.

In addition, crowd and riot-control techniques, operational rooms and the pyrotechnic aids of various countries in Europe are being studied in order to ensure that the South African Police keeps abreast of the latest developments and technology.

In order to improve the manageability and investigation of scenes of violence, urgent consultations are taking

place between internal stability division area-commanders, the attorney-general and violence investigation teams in the Witwatersrand.

**Objective 7 More Scientific Management of Crime-Information**

A crime information, analysis and interpretation centre has already been established, where a statistician is employed, with the task of analysing and interpreting crime statistics more scientifically.

Formal liaison with independent research institutions have been established in order to obtain a more comprehensive and improved perspective of crime.

**Objective 8 An Increase in the Co-operation Between the Departments of Justice, Correctional Services and the South African Police**

The constitutional three-tier theory results in the Departments of Law and Order, Justice and Correctional Services operating, to a large extent, autonomously in South Africa. These three departments function on an integrated basis in several other countries under the title of "criminal justice." Even though such a system is not possible in accordance with the South African Constitution, urgent attention is being given to the co-ordination of the activities of these three departments.

The establishment of a national interdepartmental crime prevention board has already been investigated and will be implemented on 18 May 1993 in order to improve co-operation between the South African Police, correctional services and justice. Problems at grass-roots level will be identified through this mechanism, which will have a spill-over effect and will influence successful crime-prevention.

**Objective 9 An Improvement in the Practical Functioning of Law Enforcement/Administration of Justice**

Deficiencies which exist in the South African legal system are currently being investigated.

The legal division of the South African Police has also been assigned to evaluate criminal legislation and to identify deficiencies.

A start has already been made with the prioritising of crimes, keeping in mind better policing and the improved application of the Second Criminal Law Amendment Act (Act 126 of 1992), and the situation is continually being monitored at a grass-roots level.

An efficiency investigation regarding an integrated computer system between the South African Police, justice and correctional services is currently being undertaken in order to more efficiently co-ordinate the co-operation between the three departments. This will mean that a databank will exist with regard to all bail applications and bail forfeitures, which will assist in opposing bail applications more effectively, in certain cases.

The possibility of utilizing the computer in order to assist in making evidence more speedily available in serious court cases, or cases which are of an exceptional magnitude, is being investigated.

The effect of bail, the death sentence, premature release, etcetera, on crime is being monitored on a continual basis.

**Objective 10 More Effective Application of the Mechanisms Which Have Been Established as a Result of the National Peace Accord**

Investigations are carried out on a continual basis, in co-operation with other departments and institutions, in order to determine how the mechanisms which have been established in terms of the National Peace Accord can be more suitably applied in order to combat conflict and violence.

**ANC Responds to Announcement**

*MB2503184393 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1757 GMT 25 Mar 93*

[Text] Johannesburg March 25 SAPA—The National Party [NP] government was once again trying to find military solutions to political problems, the African National Congress [ANC] said on Thursday [25 March].

It was responding to the announcement in Pretoria by Police Commissioner Johan van der Merwe of a countrywide network of additional policing involving at least 21,000 reservists and costing an estimated R[rand]10 million.

The measure forms part of the 10-point plan announced by State President F W de Klerk in Parliament on Wednesday.

The ANC said in a statement as long as the South African Police and South African Defence Force was under the sole control of the government they would be used to serve the National Party's political agenda and would have no legitimacy in the eyes of most South Africans.

"Indeed, based on experience of previous call-ups, we fear that the major call-up of 21,000 reservists could, instead of helping to prevent violence, lead to serious intimidation of local communities and even more violence."

It said the solution to the increasing cycle of violence was the speedy introduction of the transitional executive council and sub-councils, including one on security, which would ensure multiparty control over all security forces.

"Realising the urgency of this matter, the ANC months ago placed concrete proposals on the negotiating table about the structure of such a sub-council on security forces and the establishment of new and integrated security forces.

"Until now the NP government has only been stonewalling, and made no constructive contribution on how these matters could be taken forward," the statement said.

It added that instead of causing further tension and creating a siege atmosphere, the government could demonstrate a far greater commitment to peace by negotiating in good faith and ensuring that the transitional executive council and the sub-council on security forces were agreed to and established without delay.

**AEC's Stumpf, Pik Botha on Nuclear Devices, Decisions**

*MB2603112893 Johannesburg SABC TV 1 Network in Afrikaans 1830 GMT 24 Mar 93*

[Interview with Atomic Energy Corporation Chief Executive Waldo Stumpf and South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha by South African Broadcasting Corporation reporter Freek Robinson in the Cape Town parliamentary studio on the "Agenda" program—live]

[Text] [Robinson] As we have just heard in the news, the announcement and the news of the day was State President F. W. de Klerk's announcement that South Africa did in fact manufacture its own nuclear weapons. To hear more about this, we now talk to Foreign Affairs Minister Pik Botha and the chief executive officer of the Atomic Energy Corporation [AEC], Dr. Waldo Stumpf, in our parliamentary studio in Cape Town. Good evening to you.

[Botha and Stumpf] Good evening.

[Robinson] Can you both hear me well?

[Botha and Stumpf] Very well, thank you.

[Robinson] I will start with you, Dr. Stumpf. I think we first of all want particulars on the actual nature of these nuclear weapons—if we can call them that—which South Africa had. First, when exactly was this campaign started?

[Stumpf] The program was initiated in 1974, but took several years before it came to a point when the first device could be manufactured.

[Robinson] Approximately when was this done?

[Stumpf] It was toward the end of the 70's, the early 80's that we saw the first device ready.

[Robinson] Would you say more or less 1980?

[Stumpf] Approximately that time.

[Robinson] You say a device. What device was this?

[Stumpf] You must realize that the strategy was never to use the weapons. Consequently, these were just devices and not weapons in the true sense of the word.

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[Robinson] Now what is the difference between a weapon and a devise?

[Stumpf] A devise would typically be a devise which one would only use for purposes of demonstrations and which would not be used for offensive purposes.

[Robinson] Then why should one keep it?

[Stumpf] It was a deterrent, something you will have to ask Mr. Botha about.

[Robinson] But if it was only a demonstration model, how could it then be a deterrent?

[Stumpf] In the sense that it could in fact be a deterrent, the world would speculate about whether or not we had the ability.

[Robinson] The ability to make it?

[Stumpf] That is correct.

[Robinson] But do you want to say that we have never really had an atom bomb?

[Stumpf] No. One can indeed say that should a situation have arisen, we would have switched it over, but that was fortunately never the strategy.

[Robinson] So it has never ever been in a form that it could be used as an atom bomb?

[Stumpf] Not really.

[Robinson] In what form was it then?

[Stumpf] That information we do not really want to disclose. You know, under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, a country undertakes not to manufacture nuclear weapons, purchase, or even dispense of technology, so I think in the interest of nonproliferation we do not want to disclose technical information.

[Robinson] I could take it that you are afraid to give us that information, but I would very much like to know, if those devises could have been used, in what forms would they have been used?

[Stumpf] They could only then have been used in an underground test as a demonstration that South Africa does have the capability.

[Robinson] Has it ever been done?

[Stumpf] No, it was never done.

[Robinson] Neither underground nor at sea?

[Stumpf] No, not at all.

[Robinson] Are you aware that the Americans have said it was done?

[Stumpf] Well, I am aware of that, but if we could refer to that incident in the Atlantic, when President Carter even appointed experts to investigate the matter, and

finally came to the conclusion that it was a micro-meteor which struck the satellite, and there was no nuclear weapon. There was in any case no waste material detected in the southern Atlantic Ocean. South Africa was in no way involved.

[Robinson] If such a devise could be used, how would it be used, say for instance in missile firing, or with an aircraft, or how?

[Stumpf] I think, theoretically, this devise could have been fired from an aircraft or a missile, but it was fortunately never the strategy, and it was also not necessary.

[Robinson] About how many were built? Six at this...

[Stumpf, interrupting] There was permission for seven, but when the program was terminated, there were six completed.

[Robinson] Was the seventh under construction?

[Stumpf] Yes, it was being manufactured.

[Robinson] When was the decision taken to terminate it?

[Stumpf] The decision was taken late in 1989 in principle, and was confirmed very early in 1990 under the present state president.

[Robinson] When was it in reality dismantled?

[Stumpf] The dismantling started early in 1990, February, March, when the launching installation at Pelindaba were closed. The dismantling was preceded by comprehensive procedures which had been drawn up. As you also know, an auditor was appointed, Professor Wynand Mouton who audited the whole dismantling process.

[Robinson] That started in 1990, you say. When was it completed?

[Stumpf] It was completed in July 1991, just before we signed the proliferation treaty on 10 July 1991.

[Robinson] All six were completely dismantled at that time. In other words, during a period of about a year?

[Stumpf] That is correct. All six. The material was remelted and returned for storage, the hardware was dismantled and destroyed, and the drawings were also destroyed.

[Robinson] What happened to the uranium?

[Stumpf] The uranium is presently with the AEC, and being stored under full international...

[Robinson] Sorry for interrupting, what is AEC?

[Stumpf] The Atomic Energy Corporation. The uranium is presently with the Atomic Energy Corporation where it is being stored under full international control. Everything has been declared to the AEC, is under their

inspection, the seals are in their vaults, the cameras, and so on. The uranium is very precious to us in the sense that it can be used as fuel for the Safari reactor to manufacture medical isotopes.

[Robinson] I can deduce from what you have said that South Africa's under signing of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty was in other words delayed up until the stage when we were sure that such weapons did not exist in South Africa.

[Stumpf] One could say that. I think in that regard we acted very genuinely, and when we signed the treaty we really did not have the capabilities any more.

[Robinson] Were there inspections by the International Atomic Energy Corporation or Agency?

[Stumpf] That is correct. The inspections commenced in November 1991, after we signed the guarantee agreement on 16 September.

[Robinson] Were you given a certificate that they acknowledged the fact that such weapons no longer existed?

[Stumpf] At this stage, they were not yet aware of the weapons, they in fact gave us all the certification that all the material and facilities which we declared could be accounted for. They will now have access to documentation which reflects the existence and the dismantling of the weapons.

[Robinson] Did they have any suspicion that such weapons existed?

[Stumpf] That I would not know. You will have to ask them.

[Robinson] I just want to ask you, regarding your relations currently with the International Atomic Energy Agency. What exactly is the relationship now?

[Stumpf] Mr. Robinson, the relationship is very positive. You know, we maintain a very open relationship with them, but also a professional relationship, and the relationship is in fact very positive in the sense that they have no problems with what we have declared. In fact, with our declaration of material and facilities, they made the statement that it was the most complete and professional submission of an inventory which they had ever seen anywhere in the world.

[Robinson] You say the uranium is still there and it can be used, but I have also heard that the Americans would like to buy that uranium. Would you consider it?

[Stumpf] They could be thinking about it, but there has been no negotiations. Our view is that we have a use for it, a commercial use, which could make South Africa a renowned isotopes manufacturer.

[Robinson] To what use could that be put?

[Stumpf] As I said, to make the Safari reactor really commercial, so that it could produce medical isotopes on a large scale.

[Robinson] Only for medicinal use?

[Stumpf] That is correct, yes.

[Robinson] I think we have come a long way. All I now want to know from you is: Supposing that uranium is still in your possession, as you say, and there are people who had the expertise and the knowledge, and who then were involved in the construction of those devices, or weapons rather, could they not do it again?

[Stumpf] It is technically almost impossible, Mr. Robinson. You know the material has been stored under very safe conditions, which fully comply with the convention for the physical protection of the material. South Africa is a signatory to this convention. The vaults in which the material has been stored are fully sealed by the AEC, and every three, four weeks they get inspected, there are even cameras set up. It would get known very quickly if one would try to illegally remove the materials from the vaults.

[Robinson] Who inspects them?

[Stumpf] The agency personnel from Vienna, AEC agents.

[Robinson] So it is under international supervision?

[Stumpf] Absolutely.

[Robinson] Thank you Dr. Stumpf for your participation. I think we could come back to you, but I think I have to talk to Mr. Botha. Mr. Botha, let's start with you. Can you tell us why the devices were built in the first place? From your mouth.

[Botha] I was not part of that decision, the decision was taken in 1974, so I have to rely on assumptions and deductions which I have to make, and on the strategy which was outlined to me later. If we go back to that time, that was the time when South Africa was nearing international isolation, it was the time when 50,000 Cuban troops moved into Angola. There is no doubt that a conventional threat existed for us. The Soviet Union was burdened with regional conflict in southern Africa, South Africa could not obtain weapons from anywhere, and was standing alone in the world, and if I follow the general trend of thought, the idea was to see to it that one had to develop a maximum deterrent for an eventuality such as if the Soviet Union would attack the country, then one could for instance, go to America or to Britain or France, and say look, if you do not intervene now and prevent it, then we will consider using this deterrent.

[Robinson] Against whom?

[Botha] Well, against the forces that want to attack you or want to invade you.

[Robinson] In southern Africa?

[Botha] In southern Africa or elsewhere. If you had the means, such as a vehicle to deliver the devise at long range, you could adopt a threatening stance. The major point is that a deterrent, it does not matter where you use a deterrent, you must first have credibility that you do have something like that.

[Robinson] But has there ever been such credibility, because South Africa always denied it had it [the devise]?

[Botha] No, no, no. I think you are putting it too simply, you suspected just as much as I did that we had it, and the whole world suspected it.

[Robinson] So there were suspicions?

[Botha] Yes.

[Robinson] But South Africa had not said it did not have it.

[Botha] Exactly, and the point was, we wanted to create an element of uncertainty, it was strategic consideration, it was exactly that uncertainty which prevailed, and I repeat, the country was standing alone, it was isolated, there was a conventional threat against it, and this was intended as a strategic deterrent.

[Robinson] You say we wanted to use it as a strategic deterrent, in other words you yourself were later part of that misconception that you wanted to create among the people?

[Botha] No, I do not agree with you. I do not know how you got to the word misconception, that is your own invention, not mine. The government had a responsibility, and I want to state to you tonight that most of the countries in the world also suspected that we were about to do something like that. So it is not a misconception which was created. The element of uncertainty which came about, was in fact intended to serve as a deterrent.

[Robinson] But were you part of that element of uncertainty?

[Botha] I inherited it, yes.

[Robinson] And you knew it?

[Botha] Later, yes.

[Robinson] When is later?

[Botha] In the 80s, when the things [devises] were completed.

[Robinson] How many members of the cabinet knew about it?

[Botha] That is not for me to discuss in this fashion, not matters which resort under the government.

[Robinson] Let me take the matter further up to until about two, three weeks ago when you were in America. Then it was stated in papers, why, I do not know because

I was not there, that the Americans want to buy our enriched uranium. Did you, or anybody else, talk to them along those lines?

[Botha] No, I did not talk to them about that, I was in the USA last week. The Americans' concern was that we could perhaps at some time, sell these things to an irresponsible government which harbored hostility toward the USA, or that we would not declare all our enriched uranium to the international agency, or that we had hidden some of the weapons. That, in a nutshell, was the cause for American concern.

[Robinson] Did you then tell them that we had such devises?

[Botha] No, I told them that within two weeks, two weeks from last Thursday, today is Wednesday, I said to them that two weeks from last Thursday we will allay their fears. I said: "We will allay your fears within two weeks." [quoted statement in English]. And after that they were satisfied, and the first reaction today from the USA was positive, they are satisfied with this declaration, the reaction from the International Atomic Energy Agency was positive. I am expecting a positive response from Britain, from Russia—which is the other signatory to NPT, I expect generally a positive reaction worldwide, because we have actually set an example for other countries to follow. We are the first country in the world to voluntarily, I repeat voluntarily, decide to destroy and dismantle such nuclear weapon devises, and we ought to serve as an example for other countries. I think the major powers, the nuclear powers, will welcome this step from us, as we were under no obligation to do it. The obligation in fact started the day we signed the Nonproliferation Treaty, and from that day on, South Africa complied with every requirement of the international agency. We went even further. We did what, strictly speaking, was not expected of us for the sake of commercial reasons, and also to make sure that we can now tell the world: Yes, we did have it. We have outlined our reasons, we said we destroyed it voluntarily, and through this our credibility internationally will increase.

[Robinson] Mr. Botha, you are aware there is a second instance mentioned, the missile control system, which has a very complicated name in English. The Americans were inter alia afraid that South Africa could distribute or use nuclear weapons through missiles. The question is whether South Africa is going to be part of that second system, that is, to limit the building or the distribution of missiles.

[Botha] We would very much like to. This matter I have already discussed with them, even as far back as two years ago, I said to them we want to be part of this club. Because we have this technology, but that we only wanted to utilize it for commercial and peaceful purposes. But even there you have a point. The Americans and other Western powers had built up a fear—weapons of mass destruction had to be controlled. We are saying we invite the American private sector, we invite the

French, we invite the Italians, the Germans, to develop these systems further. Then they will have a guarantee as allies, that nothing will be done here which will work against their interests in practice. So we would very much like to be a member of that controlling body which you referred to, and be part of the club, then they will have additional assurance that sales, transfers of this technology to governments who are hostile toward them, will not take place.

[Robinson] Mr. Botha, thank you very much for your participation tonight, thank you too Dr. Stumpf, for clearing up some of these points.

[Botha, Stumpf] Thank you.

#### **Makwetu Reacts to Goldstone Report, De Klerk Speech**

*MB2503123593 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1218 GMT 25 mar 93*

[Text] Johannesburg Mar 25 SAPA—Pan Africanist Congress [PAC] President Clarence Makwetu says President F W de Klerk's parliamentary address on violence is a bid to isolate the PAC and "to play up to a section of the community, namely the whites". Dismissing the findings of a Goldstone committee inquiry into APLA [Azanian People's Liberation Army] as "based on hearsay from the regime, in order to play political games with the lives of our people", he said Mr de Klerk's statements on the inquiry were a manipulation of the report.

When asked why the PAC did not participate in the inquiry, yet objected to evidence only by the SAP [South African Police] and SADF [South African Defense Force], Mr Makwetu said the organisation had not recognised the Goldstone Commission since its inception. The commission was set up by Mr de Klerk.

Addressing a Johannesburg news conference, Mr Makwetu said 20 alleged APLA members had been arrested in Ficksburg on Wednesday, and not 18 as announced by Mr de Klerk in Parliament. There was no evidence that those arrested were known APLA members, he added.

Mr Makwetu also warned the black community in Ficksburg was planning a mass rally later Thursday and that emotions were running high. He did not elaborate.

On the issue of South Africa's nuclear capability, Mr Makwetu said the PAC was greatly concerned about the extent of collaboration on nuclear capability between South Africa and Israel. "The threat posed to world peace by the Israeli nuclear capability must also be investigated by the international community."

#### **PAC Questions Delay in Government Nuclear Announcement**

*MB2503160193 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1453 GMT 25 Mar 93*

[Text] Johannesburg Mar 25 SAPA—The Pan Africanist Congress [PAC] has criticised the government for not coming forward earlier with the truth about South Africa's nuclear programme, and for taking so long to scrap the project.

At a news conference on Thursday [25 March], PAC President Clarence Makwetu said his organisation and international intelligence sources had known about the programme for quite some time.

State President F W de Klerk on Wednesday announced the nuclear programme, in which South Africa had built six nuclear devices, had been abandoned in 1989.

Mr. Makwetu alleged South Africa had been working with Israel on the development of nuclear capabilities, and called for an explanation on the extent of the collaboration between the two countries.

"The threat posed to world peace by the Israeli nuclear capability must also be investigated by the international community."

Mr. Makwetu asked why the decision to discard nuclear weapons had not been announced earlier.

#### **AVU Official on De Klerk Nuclear Revelations**

*MB2503121093 Johannesburg SAPA in English 0951 GMT 25 Mar 93*

[Text] Cape Town Mar 25 SAPA—The scientists who, without outside help, succeeded in developing nuclear weapons for South Africa should be congratulated for their achievement, the Afrikaner Volksunie's [AVU—Afrikaner National Union] Mr Chris de Jager said in a statement on Thursday [25 March]. He said the AVU understood that these weapons had to be destroyed, particularly after the fall of communism and the withdrawal of international forces from southern Africa.

"It would have been irresponsible to have kept those weapons for a still unknown future regime which could have used them for offensive, instead of defensive, purposes."

#### **DP Leader, AAM Discuss Weapons Program**

*MB2503101793 Umtata Capital Radio in English 0500 GMT 25 Mar 93*

[Text] Democratic Party [DP] leader Zach de Beer says the state president has finally confirmed what had long been suspected. He says South Africa's nuclear weapons program has been hidden by a stream of untruths by the National Party government. De Beer says one wonders if ever all the shameful truth about what the Nats [National Party] really did, is going to come out.

The London-based Anti-Apartheid Movement [AAM] is even more scathing. It says South Africa lied, and deceived the international community about its nuclear weapons program for nearly three decades. The AAM says urgent action by the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency is needed to ensure South Africa has abandoned its nuclear weapons ambitions.

### Vice Admiral on 'Defensive' Chemical, Biological Warfare

MB2503144493 Pretoria PARATUS in English Mar 93  
pp 30, 31

[Article by Vice Admiral A.G. Malherbe, chief of Staff Logistics: 25 "Chemical and Biological Warfare"]

[Text] The field of defensive Chemical and Biological Warfare [CBW] is a relatively new one for the South African defence industry. Prior to 1985, the SA [South Africa] defensive CBW ability consisted only of some stockpiles of outdated equipment, and limited training using manuals and information based on old defensive CBW doctrine.

However the threat of chemical warfare appearing during the Angolan conflict over the period 1985 to 1989 changed that situation, and an intensive effort was made to update an international understanding of the field and to equip South African soldiers to cope with the threat.

Rapid progress was made, resulting in the establishing of advanced equipment testing abilities, coupled to research and development expertise and, finally, the fielding of a variety of defensive systems.

The South African defensive CBW project was divided into the traditional areas of protection, detection, decontamination and medical support. In each area of technology, a survey was made of the best international developments, followed by own evaluation of the most suitable options. A facility capable of laboratory scale synthesis of threat agents was established, and a "hot-testing" philosophy followed.

All South African equipment is tested against actual CW aggressors according to international standards, as well as using locally developed standards and test methods aimed at achieving more practical and useful results than many traditional methods.

A vital feature of the research and development work has been the close-operation of a multi-disciplinary development team and the end-users. Early in the process of equipment evaluation in typical local climatic conditions, it was realised that the use of protective systems can be a burden as important as the chemical threat itself.

It became critical to adopt a development approach which combined technical and equipment related expertise with human performance evaluation abilities, to

incorporate resulting products into a defensive doctrine uniquely developed to take the defensive burden into account.

It was found that typical international defensive CBW doctrines incorporating a "low risk-high protection" philosophy were impractical for Southern African circumstances, and an approach was developed more suitable for the prevailing semi-tropical conditions of the Southern African military theaters.

In particular, the Cuban/Soviet influence in Southern Africa (and especially Angola) directed the defensive program against the threat posed by the classical chemical offensive potential of the East Bloc military doctrine. The project in those days was driven by the needs of active conventional military involvement.

However the situation in the 1990's is very different. South Africa is no longer involved in a conventional conflict and the Soviet/Cuban influence in Southern Africa is vastly diminished if not non-existent. East Bloc desire/ability to arm local conflicts has significantly decreased.

The South African political situation is in a state of change. The entire defence industry has entered a period of rationalisation. Reduced defence expenditure dictates that strict motivation and prioritization must be applied to all development projects.

South Africa is on the verge of preacceptance into the international community, with a variety of responsibilities pending.

In the light of these developments, it is necessary for us to re-evaluate the direction of our defensive CBW project, and to ensure that effort and money is being spent in areas that are necessary, and that offer useful abilities and solutions to our security forces' needs.

There are a number of international trends/happenings of which we should be aware, and which should be used to direct our planning.

The traditional international CBW threat scenario consisting mainly of superpower controlled stockpiles coupled to either NATO or Warsaw Pact doctrine, has been replaced by a far more dangerous threat. Interest in CBW by Third World and developing countries has led to a more diffuse threat that is difficult to monitor, and which has appeared in many regional conflicts in forms far removed from our traditional understanding of CBW.

South Africa is entering a period in history where we stand to emerge as a regional, if not continental power, and military trends to the north of us are likely to become of increasing importance to our own planning.

The appearance of more varied and effective delivery systems (including the chemically armed ballistic missile) has allowed a re-evaluation of the role and effectiveness of chemical weapons on the modern battlefield.

This effectiveness was tragically demonstrated during the First Gulf War between Iran and Iraq. Ballistic missiles have enabled chemical weapons to take their place amongst weapons that can be used to terrorise the cities of nations, and be used to counter suspected nuclear threats.

The spread of CBW technology in the developing world, and the availability of free-market expertise (ex East Bloc scientists) has increased the international threat of terrorist groups acquiring and using Chemical and Biological weapons.

CBW has been taken seriously enough by the international community for an attempt to be made to rid the world permanently of the threat. A new Chemical Weapons Convention was tabled for signing by the nations of the world in Paris in January 1993.

A question that needs to be asked by all nations is how this convention will affect defensive CBW needs:

Can it control the threat to such an extent that CBW defence will become unnecessary?

What technological demands will be made on signatory countries to allow compliance with the Convention requirements?

What are the implications for countries who either decide to sign or not to sign the Convention? This has to be assessed from a political, economic and military point of view.

It is evident from the above discussion that intelligent decisions on defensive CBW research and development today are inextricably linked to an understanding of international events and trends. This can then be applied to own circumstances to determine local requirements. However the sensitivity with which this subject is usually treated, as well as South Africa's long standing isolation from the international community, has made this type of information exceptionally difficult to come by.

### **Heitman Discusses Implications of Nuclear Capabilities**

*MB2603083793 Johannesburg SABC TV 1 Network in English 1830 GMT 25 Mar 93*

[Interview with Helmoed Heitman of JANE'S DEFENSE WEEKLY, in the Cape Town Studio, by Penny Smythe in the Johannesburg Studio on the "Agenda" program—live]

[Text] [Smythe] In our Cape Town studio to discuss the military implications of South Africa's nuclear capabilities is Helmoed Heitman of JANE'S DEFENSE WEEKLY. Good evening Mr. Heitman.

[Heitman] Good evening.

[Smythe] South Africa's nuclear developments came about at a time when the government of that day was

preaching a great deal of total onslaught. Why, from a military point of view, did South Africa need a nuclear deterrent in the first place?

[Heitman] I think it is more a political military drama than a military thing in the sense that all nuclear weapons really are more political tools than they ever are weapons. The problem facing South Africa militarily in the mid-70s, was that should sovereign expansionism, which at that stage was pretty much riding high, have done some more than it did in southern Africa. The South African armed forces were pretty well unequipped to deal with it. They were very short of heavy equipment, they were facing difficulties in getting new heavy equipment, and obviously were grossly outmatched by, even Soviet surrogates, let alone the Soviets. So the theory there was perhaps that a little bit of that deterrent element might be worth having.

[Smythe] But do you think sanctions actually pushed South Africa into creating a nuclear deterrent in the first place?

[Heitman] I think the suspicion that effective armed sanctions were on the way, yes, that would have been a major factor in looking at nuclear weapons, because really, nuclear weapons were not that terribly useful from a military viewpoint in the southern African theater.

[Smythe] But now at a time when South Africa was so isolated from international know-how and technology, how possible was it for South Africans to have conceived and created these nuclear devices completely alone without any help from outside?

[Heitman] Well, the basic process of creating a nuclear device is not that unknown, its expensive, its complex, but creating a thing that can in theory go bang when you need it is not impossible for a country with a first rate engineering electronics capability.

[Smythe] Because there have been accusations that scientists from outside the country possibly from eastern Europe, have been in here to help local scientists. Do you believe that's not actually the case?

[Heitman] I doubt it quite honestly, you know the trick with nuclear weapons when it becomes complex, is if you're going into the more futuristic weapons, or if you're going into very small yield warheads, very complex warheads.

[Smythe] Speaking of accusations, there have also been accusations of collaboration or whatever you'd like to call it, between Israel and South Africa. To what extent do you believe that was the case?

[Heitman] I really don't know enough to say that I believe it or not. I certainly could accept it if I was told it happened I wouldn't be surprised, but I haven't any information really to confirm it or deny it.

[Smythe] Right, Mr. Heitman, thank you very much for your time from Cape Town this evening and your contribution to Agenda.

**Holomisa Says De Klerk Orders APLA Members 'Wiped Out'**

*MB2503130493 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1140  
GMT 25 Mar 93*

[By David Greybe]

[Text] Johannesburg Mar 25 SAPA—Maj-Gen Bantu Holomisa says he has intelligence information that President F W de Klerk personally gave an order to the effect that people identified as APLA [Azanian People's Liberation Army —military wing of the Pan-Africanist Congress] members resident in the Transkei should be "wiped out" as a matter of extreme urgency. "This unequivocally demonstrates that 'Operation Katzen'... remains in force," the Transkei military ruler said in a letter to Mr. de Klerk of the alleged plan to form a strong Xhosa-based anti-African National Congress power-block in the Eastern Cape.

He was reacting to a diplomatic note from South Africa on Wednesday [24 March], of which SAPA has a copy, following the release of preliminary findings of a Goldstone Commission committee of inquiry into the armed wing of the Pan Africanist Congress.

Pretoria said in the two-page diplomatic note that the Goldstone findings into APLA, "which point to active involvement of official institutions of the Transkei in APLA actions in South Africa, are a source of serious concern".

South Africa regarded the Goldstone findings in an extremely serious light and urgently requested the Transkeian government's response.

"I would like to alert you to the fact that our intelligence is aware of the order personally given by you to the effect that certain persons deemed to be APLA members resident in Transkei be wiped out as matter of extreme urgency," Gen Holomisa said in a six-page response to Mr. de Klerk. "Part of the purpose of mobilising the Citizen Force is to achieve this purpose," he said referring to Mr. de Klerk's announcement in Parliament on Wednesday that there would be a dramatic increase in military call-ups to combat the ongoing violence.

"We are reliably informed that as from Monday, March 22, the security forces in East London have started spray-painting cars and changing number plates to stage the operation as part of your 10-point plan," Gen Holomisa said. Details of the 10-point plan are to be unveiled on Thursday.

"Luxury buses purporting to convey tourists to and from Transkei will be used to transport the would-be murderers." Gen Holomisa provided the name of the bus company which Transkei's intelligence had identified for the operation.

Members of South Africa's security forces had met in East London on Wednesday, where they "finalised ways and means of eliminating innocent people", he alleged.

"... You have threatened to take action against Transkei. Please ensure you have taken precautionary measures so that the consequences of your actions do not boomerang," he said in the letter.

This "threat" against the Transkei would be taken up with Umtata's allies in the Patriotic Front.

Gen Holomisa again rejected the Goldstone findings on APLA.

The SA [South Africa] Defence Force and SA Police were the only parties which accepted invitations to submit evidence to the Goldstone Committee.

He denied on Wednesday that there were any APLA bases in the Transkei, or that the territory was being used as an APLA springboard or to train its members.

If Pretoria was still interested in investigating APLA activities and alleged bases in the Transkei, his government's offer of an independent Transkei inquiry headed by a seconded South African judge still stood, Gen Holomisa said on Thursday.

"You are kindly requested to convey to Judge Goldstone that Transkei will not participate in its investigations. They are free to sentence us in absentia as they have already done.

"The grandstanding and political posturing which accompanied the release of the so-called findings of the Goldstone Commission of Inquiry into APLA, and the singling (out) ... of Transkei as a villain, is totally unacceptable to the government and people of Transkei.

"The honeymoon of riding on the backs of liberation movements to facilitate South Africa's acceptance back into the fold of the international community is about to be over.

"Transkei will jealously guard against any determined effort by your government to drive a wedge between the liberation movements."

Gen Holomisa said the Transkei was well-informed of the National Party government's dirty tricks campaigns and had a huge store of information to prove it.

He still had 12 highly confidential security files in his possession which would, when released, "prove that... covert operations still do take place under your presidency".

**Government Calls Holomisa Response 'Inadequate'**

*MB2503191093 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1837  
GMT 25 Mar 93*

[Text] Cape Town March 25 SAPA—Transkei leader Maj-Gen Bantu Holomisa's reply to accusations by the South African Government of official Transkei involvement in Azanian Peoples Liberation Army [APLA] actions against South Africa were "unsatisfactory" and "inadequate", a South African Government spokesman said on Thursday [25 March].

He was reacting in a statement to Gen Holomisa's reply to a diplomatic note from South Africa on Wednesday following the release of preliminary findings of a Goldstone Commission Committee of Inquiry into APLA, the armed wing of the Pan Africanist Congress.

"The reaction of the Transkei government, received earlier today (Thursday), includes allegations and accusations which are completely untrue and on which the (South African) Government, in some cases, has earlier given its standpoint," the spokesman said.

"Gen Holomisa's statement contains many misrepresentations and emotional outbursts. The government considers this as propaganda and misleading."

He said the report of the Goldstone Commission and that of the committee which investigated APLA's activities was based on controlled evidence.

Gen Holomisa's "insulting reaction" to Mr Justice Goldstone's preliminary report was therefore to be deplored.

"The government is now preparing its reply to Gen Holomisa's note and will release it soon after it has been sent to Umtata," the spokesman said.

**PAC To 'Hit Pretoria Hard' if Transkei Attacked**

*MB2603081293 Johannesburg SAPA in English 0747  
GMT 26 Mar 93*

[Text] Johannesburg Mar 26 SAPA—The Pan-Africanist Congress [PAC] has warned the South African Government not to dream of attacking Transkei because the organisation would hit Pretoria hard.

PAC General-Secretary Benny Alexander said in a statement on Friday [26 March] that his organisation was aware of plans by the South African Government to attack the Transkei.

"The PAC of Azania has majority support in the Transkei/Border area and any attack on the people of that area will be construed by us as a direct military attack on the PAC.

"We stand ready to retaliate in the manner we deem appropriate. We wish to advise Pretoria not to even dream of attacking Transkei. We will hit you very hard," the statement said.

The PAC reiterated its rejection of a Goldstone Committee finding of Azanian People's Liberation Army activities in the Transkei.

Mr Alexander denied there was an APLA base in the Transkei or in any other homeland.

The PAC was reacting to Thursday's [25 March] announcement by homeland leader Maj-Gen Bantu Holomisa that the South African Government intended wiping-out people identified as APLA members resident in the Transkei.

Gen Holomisa said he had intelligence information that State President F. W. de Klerk had given the order for the action against alleged APLA members.

**AVU Proposes Economic Sanctions Against Transkei**

*MB2603072993 Johannesburg SAPA in English 2126  
GMT 25 Mar 93*

[Text] Pretoria March 25 SAPA—South Africa should impose economic sanctions against Transkei and destroy Azanian Peoples Liberation Army [APLA] "nests" in Maj-Gen Bantu Holomisa's homeland, the Afrikaner Volksunie [Afrikaner People's Union—AVU] said on Wednesday [24 March].

In addition, the borders between the two countries should be closed, AVU member Moolman Mentz said in a statement.

Reacting to Goldstone Commission findings on Transkei being used by APLA as a springboard for attacks into South Africa, Mr Mentz said it was vital that APLA bases in Transkei be traced and destroyed "regardless of the consequences".

"It can no longer be tolerated that murder and crime be planned and executed from a neighbouring country. People's lives may no longer be endangered," Mr Mentz said.

APLA leaders should be prosecuted in terms of the Internal Security Act and hearings should be conducted in terms of the criminal procedure second amendment act so that they could be concluded speedily.

"The country cannot afford that these hearings drag on for a year or longer."

The government would be guilty of an "inexcusable dereliction of duty" if it failed to act now, said Mr Mentz.

**Gunmen Kill 3, Injure 1 in Ezimbokodweni**

*MB2603081193 Johannesburg SAPA in English 0803  
GMT 26 Mar 93*

[Text] Durban Mar 26 SAPA—Three women were lined up against a wall and gunned down by killers who entered their home in Ezimbokodweni, near kwaMakhutha, on Thursday [25 March] night.

Police said three men entered the home in the rural settlement about 40km south of Durban at 10pm. They told the women to line up against a wall, and opened fire.

Three women were killed and a fourth was critically injured.

KwaZulu Police said the survivor was taken to hospital with severe chest wounds.

The motive for the murder was not known but Ezimbokodweni has been wracked by politically-linked killings over the past year with weekly reports of bloodshed there.

Police had no further details and said they were investigating.

### PAC's Alexander Denies APLA Fighting Race War

*MB2503145993 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1347  
GMT 25 Mar 93*

[Text] Johannesburg Mar 25 SAPA—The Pan Africanist Congress' [PAC] armed wing APLA [Azanian People's Liberation Army] was not fighting a race war, PAC Secretary-General Benny Alexander said on Thursday [25 March].

Referring to the spate of attacks on whites recently, Mr Alexander said the PAC regretted any killings.

He told a Johannesburg news conference his organisation had not been able to establish whether the Azanian People's Liberation Army had been responsible for the killing of five whites last week.

APLA's high command had said it had no knowledge of the killings.

Mr Alexander reiterated it was not the PAC's policy to kill women and children, and called on the government to release further information about the Eikenhof killings south of Johannesburg last week.

A 35-year-old woman, her son and two teenagers died when their car was ambushed by unidentified black men last Friday [19 March].

Mr Alexander said claims of a race war against whites had been made several weeks ago by a man called Congo Jibril.

APLA had since publicly condemned Mr Jibril and an APLA high commander had stated that he was not a member of the armed wing, Mr Alexander said.

No race had been singled out as a target said Mr Alexander, referred to earlier news reports that APLA was responsible for the death of black policemen as substantiation.

He refused, however, to confirm whether APLA was responsible for the killing of black policemen.

Mr Alexander further said his organisation rejected allegations by a committee of the Goldstone Commission in its report on APLA, released on Wednesday, that the Transkei was a springboard for APLA cadres.

### PAC's Makwetu Proposes Armies Cease Armed Activity

*MB2503145993 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1409  
GMT 25 Mar 93*

[Text] Johannesburg Mar 25 SAPA—Pan Africanist Congress [PAC] President Clarence Makwetu has proposed the signing of "a mutual cessation of hostilities agreement by all parties with armed formations".

But the PAC could not immediately consider abandoning the armed struggle, he told a Johannesburg news conference on Thursday [25 March].

"The PAC can only consider abandoning the bullet in overthrowing the regime when the ballot is secure", he said in reaction to President F W de Klerk's condemnation of the continuation of the armed struggle.

Several meetings with the government had confirmed the PAC was the only organisation not involved in intimidatory township violence, said Mr. Makwetu.

"Random intimidatory township violence is perpetrated by foreign mercenaries and signatories of the National Peace Accord [NPA]," he alleged.

Mr. Makwetu called for foreign mercenaries to be expelled from the country or to be confined to barracks. He did not say where the foreign mercenaries came from.

"The NPA is fatally defective in its shortcomings and its structures are inappropriate," he concluded.

The PAC is not a signatory of the peace accord.

### PAC Not To Attend Patriotic Front Meeting 27-28 Mar

*MB2503161293 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1540  
GMT 25 Mar 93*

[Text] Johannesburg March 25 SAPA—The Pan Africanist Congress [PAC] on Thursday [25 March] announced it would not attend the Patriotic Front [PF] meeting convened by the African National Congress [ANC] and its Codesa [Convention for a Democratic South Africa] allies on March 27/28 outside Johannesburg, citing the ANC's "unilateral" action to proceed with the congress as a violation of a previous agreement.

About 100 organisations have been invited to attend the Codesa Patriotic Front gathering in Lenasia, south-west of Johannesburg, at the weekend.

In a statement in Johannesburg, PAC Secretary for Political Affairs Jaki Seroke said his organisation first heard of the meeting through the media. Thereafter, the PAC was invited by the ANC.

"The PAC was naturally shocked that the name and logo of the Durban Patriotic/United Front was used to invite the PAC and several other organisations. PAC, as co-convenor with the ANC of the Durban Conference on October 25/27, 1991, was not consulted on this conference by its co-convenor, the ANC," said Mr Seroke.

The PAC official continued that his organisation then held a series of meetings with the ANC earlier this week aimed at resolving problems arising from what the PAC believed was the ANC's "unilateral action which violated decisions of the Durban Patriotic Front".

"Regrettably, these (talks) have been unsuccessful. The PAC will not be in Lenasia.

"The PAC, however, will continue consultations with other organisations of the oppressed to forge a genuine patriotic front," the statement said.

The organisation added that the quest for a genuine PF had been dealt with by the Organisation of African Unity and the Frontline States, most recently at the Harare Frontline Summit on December 11 last year.

"Unfortunately, delaying tactics were played by the ANC until the latest, when we heard of the Lenasia meeting," said Mr Seroke.

### Mandela Meets ELC, AZAPO Officials

*MB2503120993 Jo'annesburg SAPA in English 1003  
GMT 25 Mar 93*

[Text] Johannesburg Mar 25 SAPA—African National Congress [ANC] President Nelson Mandela met a visiting commission of the European Community and Afro-Caribbean-Pacific group delegation in Johannesburg on Thursday [25 March]. According to ANC spokesman Carl Niehaus, they held "general discussions about the political situation".

At a separate meeting immediately before, Mr Mandela met Azanian People's Organisation [AZAPO] President Prof Itumaleng Mosala. Both leaders said their talks, which were routine, had focused on "the unity of liberation movements".

A meeting of the reconvened Patriotic Front [PF] is expected to be held in Johannesburg this weekend. The ANC, AZAPO and Pan Africanist Congress are key players in the PF.

### 26 Mar Review of Press Editorial, Commentaries *MB2603150393*

[Editorial Report]

#### THE STAR

Criticism of Nuclear Weapons Secrecy—Johannesburg THE STAR in English on 26 March in a page 16 editorial comments on President de Klerk's admission that South Africa did develop "a limited nuclear capability" during the 1970s and 1980s. "De Klerk's confession about the past must be linked to his statements about the future. His motivation was, in part, to place South Africa's commitments as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 'above any doubt'. His assurances that the 'six nuclear fission devices' have been safely and completely destroyed must be accepted." However, even though De Klerk insists that the country gained because "the enrichment technology and the resultant nuclear materials will contribute to the peaceful use of nuclear power," BUSINESS DAY believes a "more valuable contribution would have been made if there had been no secret plan to produce nuclear weapons as the ultimate defence of apartheid, just as peaceful settlement would have been advanced if there had been an earlier retreat out of apartheid's impasse."

Support for De Klerk's Anti-Violence Initiatives—A second editorial on the same page points out that "whatever the problems—and there are many—attached to President de Klerk's specific new initiatives against violence, they indicate that the Government is getting its priorities right." Furthermore, if Transkei's General Bantu Holomisa refuses to respond seriously to the Goldstone Commission's findings on the Azanian People's Liberation Army, APLA, activity in his area, "Pretoria should squeeze him financially. If PAC officials refuse to explain their role in APLA's operations, they should be excluded from negotiations."

#### BUSINESS DAY

Nuclear Weapons Admission—"From the people who said our troops were not in Angola, and denied any knowledge of the Webster and Goniwe assassinations, we now have an admission that the past 20 years' denials and dissembling over South African nuclear weapons were lies," begins a page 8 editorial in Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English on 26 March. "That is not to detract from President de Klerk's sincerity when he disclosed the programme's existence. Nor will it detract from the diplomatic gains government may make from the confession, even though the existence of a nuclear weapons programme has been known by most Western intelligence agencies for years." "The excuse that a nuclear programme was necessary as a deterrent is specious." "Then, as now, threats to Nat rule came from within SA [South Africa], not from without. Our clutch of bombs could only feasibly have been used as doomsday weapons, capable only of mass, indiscriminate killing. Disclosure of a nuclear weapons programme is only a small contribution to the openness needed from this government and its agencies before true reconciliation is possible in SA."

### SOWETAN

'Levelheaded' De Klerk Response To Violence—"De Klerk should be congratulated on his levelheaded response of demanding that the whole question of political violence be placed on the agenda of the multiparty negotiations," says the Johannesburg SOWETAN in English on 26 March in a page 12 editorial. "He had chosen the careful balance between controlled outrage and practical politics."

### NEW NATION

Retaliation for Attacks on Whites May Come From Third Force—Referring to recent attacks on white civilians by "as yet unidentified people", Johannesburg NEW NATION in English for 26 March-1 April in its page 14 editorial says: "The deafening silence of the APLA leadership on the matter is most disturbing because it may be that we are attributing a political reason for the killings where in fact none may exist. The most disturbing aspect of the APLA silence is that it will create space for the commission of violence in its name by random criminals and even agents of the third force. We have seen too often that elements of the third force thrive on conditions where wanton violence is given a political character and thus respectability. It happened with the fuelling of tension between the ANC and Inkatha, it happened with the creation of the appropriate atmosphere for intra ethnic clashes, and now we see it taking a new level of white-black conflict." "The threats of retaliation from the right wing, while given a lot of coverage, cannot be taken too seriously. Our fear is that the real threat will once more come from within the security establishment via the third force."

### THE WEEKLY MAIL

Nuclear Weapons Announcement 'Half-Truths'—Commenting on President de Klerk's announcement of the country's limited nuclear capabilities, the Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL in English for 26 March-1 April says: "The government tells us that the cabinet was only informed of the bombs last week. Are these the same people who lecture us about democracy and its safeguards? The government also tells us that they are now going to be fully transparent about nuclear activity. Does this mean they will ditch the Atomic Energy Act, which is designed to keep us ignorant? The first signs are not good. F. W. de Klerk's announcement was still riddled with half-truths and obfuscations of the true nature of these bombs."

### \* ANC, Government Intelligence Merger Assessed

#### ANC, Government Goals

93AF0399A Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL in English 29 Jan 93 p 10

[Article by Philippa Garson and Derek Fleming: "Getting All the Spies in From the Cold"; italicized words as published]

[Text] Existing intelligence operatives may retain their jobs during the power-sharing era, but if the African National Congress [ANC] has its way, the new, integrated intelligence service will have dramatically different goals and functions.

In particular, the ANC is insisting that a future service must comply with international trends of greater openness and accountability.

The government, while moving on the integration of Umkhonto weSizwe and the South African Defence Force [SADF], still seems hesitant to merge its intelligence wings with those of the ANC.

The formation of a new intelligence system, central to the integration of the security forces for the transitional period, was high on the agenda of the ANC-government *bosberaad*. But, according to sources, the issue was not tackled at this week's bilateral discussions and the government seems reluctant to give ground on this last bastion of its power.

One thing is clear: a future government will not give police and military intelligence free rein and endless resources to flush out reds from under beds across the country and beyond.

Their colleagues in the West are having to follow suit. With the dawn of a new global order and the emergence of one superpower, intelligence agencies have been thrown into disarray, searching desperately for new stages on which to play out their clandestine operations.

According to a senior ANC intelligence advisor, intelligence functions are being revised worldwide. "Accountability" and "transparency" are the catchwords for a new-look intelligence service—seeming contradictions for agencies staffed with hordes of faceless people who glide around in sunglasses with a dozen hidden agendas in their briefcases.

Instead of devoting themselves to clandestine dirty tricks, intelligence agencies will in future be called on to play more overt, constructive roles. In many countries, they are already subject to stricter parliamentary controls and their activities are governed by codes of conduct and ombudsmen.

"The function of intelligence agencies in the 1990s will increasingly move towards research and development. They will be expected to present the political players with scenarios and options in this regard, particularly concerning national economic interests," he says.

ANC intelligence supremos are canvassing agencies around the world in preparation for their imminent intervention in the restructuring of the state's intelligence system. During the movement's May 1991 policy conference, basic guidelines for intelligence were drawn up, emphasising the need for parliamentary control, independence from party political agendas, respect for human rights and a clear demarcation of boundaries between various intelligence wings.

The ANC wants a more streamlined civilian-based intelligence service to avoid the current overlaps between the National Intelligence Service [NIS], the Criminal Intelligence Service [CIS] (formerly the security police) and Military Intelligence, responsible for bitter competition, animosity and the squandering of resources.

"Covert operations influencing the political and security situation in the country must end. There should be satisfactory parliamentary oversight over the workings of any intelligence agency. We need increased transparency and a sensitivity to the fact that abuses can be perpetuated under the guise of secrecy."

Sandy Africa, who runs the Durban-based National Security Research Centre agrees. "We need a new intelligence system that will have to be accountable, despite the inherent contradiction between national security and democracy," she says.

"There should be one centralised intelligence service responsible for strategic, as opposed to tactical, intelligence functions. Police need intelligence to carry out crime combating, the defence force needs intelligence to resolve military conflict, but when it comes to advising the government on security with regard to the political conditions in the country, the military and the police should not be playing a role."

In her view, a new system will have to put an end to intelligence gathering on lawful political bodies. The current practice is to bug almost everybody wearing a political hat, including Codesa [Convention for Democratic South Africa] participants.

NIS, pivotal in getting the government to negotiate with the ANC, has risen to prominence in recent years. But the ANC is adamant that an entirely new intelligence service must evolve. NIS agents, though sophisticated proponents of the new South Africa are mostly white Afrikaner nationalists whose past agendas have been no loftier than those of MI or security branch.

Police intelligence-gathering skills are of a high standard, according to some ANC intelligence operatives, who consider them indispensable.

Though affirmative action is likely to change the racial composition of state intelligence agencies, "we are not going to swamp the intelligence service with black faces for the sake of it. We are looking for qualitative change," says the ANC source. The combined skills of agents trained in both East and West is likely to lend a cosmopolitan flavour to a new intelligence service.

### Potential Spy Chiefs

93AF0399B Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL in English 29 Jan 93 p 11

[Article by Eddie Koch: "Hunt for the New Smiley's People"]

[Text] The search is on for a few good men to overhaul the intelligence machine that is falling apart along with the system it was set up to defend—and it's not going to be easy to find them.

Joe Nhlanhla, head of the African National Congress' Department of Intelligence and Security (DIS), stands in line for a top job in the new South Africa's spy agency.

Unlike the ANC's other intelligence barons—Ronnie Kasrils, Chris Hani and Jacob Zuma—Nhlanhla has a reputation for remaining above some of the feuds that have taken place within the ANC's military wing.

"He has no record of getting involved in political games and is regarded as a competent official. He has always been recognised for his bureaucratic skills," says Steve Ellis, director of the Africa Studies Centre at the University of Leiden in Holland.

However, Nhlanhla as well as some of his agents have been compromised by allegations of torture at the ANC's detention camps in Angola and Zambia. He took over the DIS from Mzwai Piliso, the man blamed for most of the abuses, in the mid-1980s, in an effort to clean up the department.

Nhlanhla succeeded to some extent but less serious forms of torture continued to take place. This blot on his copybook will jeopardise the DIS chief's chances of leading a new intelligence agency.

General CP "Joffel" van der Westhuizen, the flamboyant chief of military intelligence (DMI), is a non-starter. He has been hopelessly compromised by the notorious Goniwe signal message and the ANC will fight tooth-and-nail to prevent him from having any power in a new intelligence world.

The general's Directorate of Covert Collection (DCC) has taken the brunt of recent purges in the SADF [South African Defense Forces] and it is clear that the National Intelligence Service (NIS) has been working hard to erode the once-powerful department that Van der Westhuizen headed.

But Van der Westhuizen is a resourceful man and has been working hard behind the scenes to salvage his career. Much will depend on the outcome of the Goniwe inquest which begins in March this year. But it seems the best he can hope for is to remain head of a weak and dismembered military intelligence unit.

The dark horse is Michael James Minnaar Louw, director general of the NIS. His agency is the one most in control of the current spy versus spy war and it is currently being beefed up to replace DMI as the country's premier intelligence centre.

Louw served a spell in DMI after obtaining an honours degree at the University of the Free State in 1962. He joined the Bureau for State Security after its foundation in 1969 and has served in several posts in the NIS including that of special advisor to the director general.

Louw and his agents have a reputation in rival agencies for being the "boys in suits"—academics without any experience in the tough world of intelligence and counter-intelligence.

But his big advantage is that nobody knows much about him. His record looks clean and there is no evidence of dirty tricks and human rights abuses—always an advantage when there are few other good men around.

### Divisions in Official Service

*93AF0399C Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL in English 29 Jan 93 pp 10-11*

[Article by Eddie Koch and Philippa Garson: "A Cloak-and-Dagger War"]

[Text] Spying in South Africa is now more complex than the plot of a Frederick Forsyth novel as at least 12 official intelligence agencies—each with rival networks of spies, agents and double agents—are engaged in a bizarre set of battles to influence the future of the country.

Look at a checklist of the major spy centres that operate in the country. It contains the Department of Military Intelligence (DMI), the National Intelligence Service (NIS), S.A. Police Intelligence, the African National Congress' [ANC] Department of Intelligence and Security (DIS) as well as the Goldstone Commission's hot-shot team of police investigators.

Add to it the following: the South African Defence Force [SADF] has separate intelligence units in the army, navy and air force. Each of the independent homelands—Transkei, Ciskei, Venda and Bophuthatswana—have fully fledged armies with their own mini-intelligence outfits. And then there's the kwaZulu Police's sophisticated intelligence operation in Ulundi.

With at least a dozen covert agencies at work in the country, South Africans can be forgiven for thinking they are the most spied upon nation in the world. But there has been such a spate of bungles and backstabbing within the intelligence community of late that it appears ordinary citizens, and would-be subversives, have little to worry about.

It has become clear that Judge Richard Goldstone's raid on military intelligence's Department of Covert Collection (DCC) late last year—which led to the purge of 23 army officers—was preceded by more than a little co-operation between his team of police "untouchables" and agents from the NIS who were determined to rid MI of some unco-operative officers.

A small but significant incident attests to this. After the Bisho massacre in September a reporter on a Johannesburg newspaper, Patrick Bulger, began probing the possibility that a team of Umkhonto weSizwe (MK) guerrillas was assassinated by a professional hit squad inside the Bisho stadium.

The NIS got to hear of the reporter's investigations and immediately sent two agents to see Bulger. They told him that President FW de Klerk wanted to drop Gqozo but that a group of officers in military intelligence were determined to keep the Ciskei strongman in power.

The NIS pair hinted that Bulger should investigate the activities of an MI officer in connection with the alleged assassination—Colonel At Nel.

Bulger's investigation failed to uncover any evidence of the alleged assassination. But the NIS achieved its objective after the Goldstone raid in December—Nel and Brigadier Tol Botha were the two most senior officers to be axed in the purge.

Clearly, some months before the purge, NIS was searching for information that could be used to justify the dismissal of Nel—and tried to recruit a journalist to further their cause.

The Goldstone raid on DCC was itself preceded by a complex and intriguing bit of backstabbing involving at least four different factions of military intelligence and the SAP [South African Police].

The plot began with a personal tiff in 1990 between two white officers who had been seconded from the SADF to the intelligence wing of the Ciskei Defence Force. One officer, Colonel Gert Hugo, came from army intelligence in the eastern Cape. The other, Colonel Anton Niewoudt, came from DMI in Pretoria.

A bitter fight for the control of Ciskei Intelligence ensued. Niewoudt from DMI emerged the victor. Hugo from army intelligence and a number of his colleagues were ousted from the Ciskei—with a desire for revenge in their hearts.

Two years later an officer from army intelligence in the eastern Cape, whose identity had not yet been established, took a trip to Umtata where he handed over a pile of documents to the homeland's military ruler, General Bantu Holomisa.

Included was the famous signal message which indicated that General CP van der Westhuizen, Niewoudt's immediate boss, had ordered the assassination of Matthew Goniwe and a group of anti-apartheid activists in the mid-1980s.

Transkei army intelligence, which was busy investigating alleged plots by SADF intelligence to overthrow the Transkei government, promptly leaked the incriminating document and it ended up being published in the *New Nation* newspaper.

This placed the MI chief under extreme pressure. Van der Westhuizen refused to accept suggestions from the state president's office that he take a long holiday until the matter was sorted out.

A few months later things got worse for the MI general. A pair of military agents—Pamela du Randt and Leon

Flores—were arrested in London and interrogated by British intelligence, allegedly for trying to get a gang of rightwing Irish Protestants to monitor and assassinate Dirk Coetze, a renegade police captain who had exposed death squad operations carried out by the SAP's Vlakplaas unit in the 1980s.

The incident blew up into an international crisis with British Prime Minister John Major demanding an explanation from De Klerk. Things were made worse for Van der Westhuizen by the fact that he was very loyal to Pamela du Randt. She once served as his personal assistant and they were rumoured to have had a close personal friendship.

So the general called in a navy intelligence officer called John Imrie to interrogate Flores after the agents had been deported back to South Africa.

The navy man wrote a report—labelled it top secret—and submitted it to his chiefs. The document stated that Leon Flores was a former agent from the SAP's elite counter-insurgency unit called C1, or Charlie One, based at Vlakplaas. Imrie said Flores admitted under interrogation that he was in fact working for the Vlakplaas commander, Colonel Eugene de Kock, when he arranged for Coetze to be monitored by the Irish rightwingers and used the MI trip to England as a cover to do this.

Van der Westhuizen was clearly outraged. In October an inquest began into the murder of human rights lawyer Bheki Mlangeni, a man blown up by a parcel bomb addressed to Coetze. The navy intelligence documents implicating De Kock in the plot to monitor Coetze were leaked to the inquest court.

The leaked documents contained damaging details about a sensitive army intelligence operation to discredit the ANC, called Operation Echoes. The career of the Chief of the Army, General Georg Meiring, was placed in jeopardy.

But the message from Van der Westhuizen was clear: don't blame MI for the London debacle. It was all the fault of army intelligence and the police unit at Vlakplaas—and MI would go to any lengths to protect its reputation.

And there was a twist in the plot. While Navy intelligence was interrogating Flores about the Coetze incident, an NIS agent called Mike Kennedy called on Flores' former boss at Vlakplaas, De Kock, and questioned him about the incident.

According to the MI documents leaked to the inquest, De Kock was furious at being blamed for the debacle and threatened to tell the NIS man all about military officers involved in "third force" violence.

In December, when Goldstone's "untouchables" raided the offices of DMI, the team was led by a police colonel who served for many years with De Kock and was a close friend of the Vlakplaas commander.

There were other signs of rifts and revenge in the state's intelligence ranks. According to intelligence sources, when the police broke up MK's Operation Vula—a supposed plot for an armed insurrection in the net of negotiations failing—it emerged that the ANC had extensively infiltrated SAP intelligence.

A witchhunt for seven ANC moles was jeopardised when a state intelligence agent leaked this information to the press in a deliberate effort to discredit the police. Sources say this was an NIS agent angling for a top information post in the state president's office that had formerly been occupied by military and then police intelligence.

Although the country's agencies are in chaos, there are signs that a stable core of professional agents from across the spectrum is beginning to gather at the centre of the country's intelligence maelstrom.

ANC intelligence sources say their department has held a series of preliminary meetings with top NIS officials to discuss the idea of creating an integrated intelligence agency in post-apartheid South Africa (see accompanying story).

"There is no doubt that elements of the NIS and the ANC's intelligence wing will form the core of the new agency to provide a future government with strategic information," says Steven Ellis, director of the African Studies Centre at the University of Leiden.

"The major casualty will be military intelligence and elements of the SAP's counter-insurgency units. Already the DMI has been emasculated by the December purge and moves are afoot to close down the Vlakplaas unit and rid the force of its officers."

Adds Sandy Africa, researcher for the National Security Research Centre in Durban: "The NIS is playing the leading role. It has long argued for centralised civilian intelligence agency, believing that strategic and political intelligence should be the responsibility of an agency like themselves."

#### \* 'Community-Supported' Police Plan Described

93AF0409C Johannesburg FINANCIAL MAIL in English 29 Jan 93 pp 44-46

[Quotation marks as published]

[Text] After a few apparent false starts over the past two years, the S.A. Police [SAP] at last appears to be making headway in transforming the force to cope with the demands of democracy. Under the tough but pragmatic political leadership of Law & Order Minister Hernus Kriel, a slimmed down team of younger, goal-orientated generals headed by Police Commissioner Johan van der Merwe has committed itself to community-supported policing.

The plan, part of which has been implemented, was detailed by Kriel and the generals at a press briefing at Knysna. It includes:

- Local forums in which the SAP and community representatives will discuss grassroots policing;
- A committee of local and foreign experts to investigate training;
- An independent body headed by a judge and with an Attorney-General as CEO to investigate complaints against the police. (Kriel says he's not aware of any other force in the world that subjects itself to outside investigation in this way);
- Appointment of 10 members of the public with legal training to hear complaints about police behaviour—as provided for in the National Peace Accord;
- Broadening of control structures—particularly on the ground—in three key regions, the Witwatersrand, western Cape and Natal, to facilitate decentralised management;
- Demilitarisation of police tasks; and
- Consideration of a suggestion that community-appointed representatives should be allowed regularly to inspect cells and visit people in custody.

Talks aimed at winning the backing of the ANC—and other groups—for those aspects of the plan that need community support have already started and are crucial to its success, says Kriel. "The catchword is transparency. All we ask is the opportunity to implement it."

It's clear that the new approach will have to have community support—particularly from township dwellers. They must firstly accept the police as servants of the people rather than enemies, and secondly help to formulate policies and procedures that will satisfy conflicting needs of different communities.

Central to the plan is the establishment of forums at almost every police station in which the local SAP leadership and communities can interact on policing issues.

Head of SAP Efficiency Service Major General George Fivas says the move is aimed at replacing the old attitude of accountability being due only to government and judicial authority.

The SAP aims to achieve the transformation over the next three to five years, by which time it wants to be seen as impartial, nondiscriminatory, courteous, law abiding and accountable to the public.

The strategy includes new measures to ensure the minimum use of force and "acceptable methods" to maintain law and order, the professional use of personnel and cost-effective management. The headquarters component of the SAP has already been trimmed by abolishing seven lieutenant-general posts and more autonomy will be given to regional commanders. A sixth division has been added to the command structure to deal exclusively with the development of police/community relations.

New head of Community Policing Major General Morgan Chetty says he hopes to have several forums operating within six months. The aim is that communities will elect representatives.

Kriel says that, though the concept of community forums was accepted by the SAP at a time when there was no contact between government and the ANC, it has been endorsed by the Police board on which the ANC serves and there have been behind-the-scenes consultations with the ANC. He acknowledges that endorsement by political leaders is necessary to ensure success. The issue was raised at his recent meeting with ANC leaders and will come up again as a specific agenda item during talks.

Wide-ranging political acceptance of the plan is essential if it is to overcome the twin obstacles of ingrained police attitudes and harsh public perception. Up to now S.A. has not had a police force with which all people could identify. The SAP lacks political neutrality, popular support and the ability to fight crime effectively in all communities.

Under a democracy it will have to operate with the consent of the community it serves. In other words, it must be legitimised and then adequately trained and equipped to deal not only with unrest if necessary, but also with traditional policing that is under severe strain.

Government's opponents have long called for many of the changes now being proposed. ANC MP Jan van Eck has argued that communities need to feel the SAP is also their police force. "This will contribute significantly to restoring stability. It shouldn't be too difficult to achieve, there's a tremendous willingness to accept the SAP back into black communities."

But there is also an understanding of the problems the police face. Consultant Laurie Nathan, director of the University of Cape Town's Centre for Intergroup Studies & Security Policy, says there is a need for society to develop a greater appreciation of what policing entails and just how difficult it is. "Criticism of the SAP—though often justified—only adds to what is already a stressful and unrewarding job made worse by long hours, poor pay and a hostile environment."

Nathan regards involvement of communities in the transformation of the SAP as the essence of accountability. It would give whatever changes are made the necessary credibility. He believes foreign assistance in training a new police force is needed. Britain in particular applies standards that could benefit S.A. (One of the members of the new training advisory committee is from Britain.)

Kriel says the SAP is offering a hand of friendship and hopes that it will be accepted by communities. He adds that while last year's dramatic increase in police spending—up from R3bn to R5.6bn—was aimed mainly at increasing police numbers, the coming Budget will provide the resources to improve training which, he admits, is inadequate.

The new attitude of senior policemen and their willingness to acknowledge mistakes of the past is significant. Fivas, for example, says the SAP's past involvement in activities such as counterinsurgency and riot control resulted in the contamination of the force's image. The new plan, he believes, will change that.

#### \* Inkatha Rift Developing Over Felgate Role

93AF0400B Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL in English 29 Jan 93 p 3

[Article by Anton Harber: "Battle for the Soul of Inkatha"; italicized words as published]

[Text] A number of the most senior members of Inkatha are deeply disgruntled with the way Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi is handling negotiations.

One of them, national chairman and kwaZulu cabinet member Frank Mdlalose, tried to resign within the last six months. He was prevented from doing so by Buthelezi.

With Mdlalose are other kwaZulu cabinet and Inkatha central committee members, the Health Minister Dr. Ben Ngubane and Finance Minister Dennis Madide.

The division in Inkatha—which has been apparent to both the government and the ANC [African National Congress] in their recent meetings with the organisation—lies behind the publication last week of the angry memoranda exchanged by the government and Inkatha during recent talks.

It is believed that Inkatha members unhappy with Buthelezi's approach encouraged government sources to leak the document to the media.

They were trying to undermine the influence of Walter Felgate, a central committee member who, despite unpopularity in the organisation, has extraordinary personal influence over Buthelezi. These individuals are also unhappy with various rightwing constitutional experts from the U.S. and Europe who are advising Buthelezi and encouraging his hardline attitude.

ANC sources tell of two incidents in recent meetings when the division in Inkatha became apparent. At one of them, a Peace Accord meeting, Mdlalose was obliged to read out a vitriolic statement, purporting to come from Buthelezi but written by Felgate.

Immediately after it was read out, one Inkatha leader said he had been a member of Inkatha for many years and was a central committee and cabinet member, but the views expressed in the memorandum had never been discussed. "I do not associate myself with this," he said—and the rest of the Inkatha delegation agreed with him.

Sources close to the disaffected Inkatha leaders say they disagree with the organisation's continual attacks on the ANC and do not accept Buthelezi's criticism of the

ANC's armed wing, Umkhonto weSizwe, nor the demand that it be immediately disbanded.

They are also uncomfortable with Buthelezi's loose alliance, through the Concerned South Africans Group (Cosag), with far-rightwing groups.

They feel that Buthelezi sometimes expresses views, drafted by Felgate, that have not been canvassed with other senior Inkatha members. They often find out about these views only when a memorandum is read out at a meeting.

Government sources confirm that it has become apparent to their negotiators in their recent meetings with Inkatha that some senior members disagree with Buthelezi's views.

The National Party is debating how to handle this division. The dominant view is the government and the ANC must push ahead with talks and try and weaken those in Inkatha who are being obstructive. However, the Natal section, led by Frank Bartlett, believes Inkatha is their primary ally and the party should not endanger the relationship.

According to sources close to Inkatha, Mdlalose went to Buthelezi a few months ago and said he had to resign because of the death of his son. Buthelezi said nothing, but walked across his office to a filing cabinet from which he removed a document. "Is this perhaps the reason you want to resign?" he said, and showed Mdlalose a letter he had allegedly written to ANC leaders which included complaints about aspects of Inkatha policy.

Mdlalose has since denied knowledge of this incident, but it has been confirmed by others close to Inkatha.

Felgate has been the source of controversy in Inkatha before. Under pressure from his colleagues, Buthelezi has on more than one occasion agreed to sever ties with Felgate. "But he always goes to see the chief minister and gets back into favour. He is not particularly competent and has no special qualification for the job," one source said.

The same source said Felgate writes all Buthelezi speeches and the chief minister sometimes reads them out in public without having read them before. "He is more than a conventional speech writer. Nobody can explain why he is so trusted by Buthelezi."

The controversy is tied in with Inkatha's military intelligence connections, revealed last year in *The Weekly Mail*. Some government sources believe elements of MI are encouraging Buthelezi's hardline attitude, as are his Cosag allies. They are eager to loosen Buthelezi's ties to MI and Cosag and encourage Inkatha leaders who want to take a less hardline attitude.

Another factor now is that the Goldstone Commission is due to release a report that is likely to be harshly critical of the kwaZulu Police and other aspects of Inkatha activity. The inquiry was the result of *Weekly Mail*

revelations last year of extensive support for Inkatha by military intelligence front companies, including the training and arming of 200 "hit men".

#### \* Homeland Finances, Budgets, Corruption Outlined

*93AF0409A Johannesburg FINANCIAL MAIL in English 29 Jan 93 pp 28-29*

[Text] The stunted stepchildren of grand apartheid have survived the official death of that infamous policy. Some more misshapen than others, they all remain to haunt us.

According to Hendrik Verwoerd's warped vision, the only way to deal politically with the black majority was to make it disappear. Ultimately there would be no black South Africans—only Zulus and Xhosas and Vendas and Shangaans who would have the privilege of migrating from their own tribally defined countries to work in white S.A. The confident prediction by senior Cabinet Minister Connie Mulder (the man who nearly became prime minister when John Vorster resigned) was that, by 1978, the flow of blacks to the cities from the homelands would be reversed.

It would have been hilarious if they had not taken it so seriously. Transkei was the first to get independence, in 1976, followed by Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei. Known quaintly as the TBVC [Transkei Bophuthatswana Venda Ciskei] countries, they have never been recognised by any other country—but Pretoria is still locked into its charade, which consists mainly of a vast web of financial obligations. In fact, S.A.

is probably disabled by its own constitutional law from unwinding the arrangement, except by State to State negotiation.

There are other tribal territories which enjoy—if that is the word—a quasi-independence from Pretoria. These were earmarked for independence, but either refused to take it (as in the case of Mangosuthu Buthelezi's Kwa-Zulu) or were adjudged not ready for it—until finally government admitted that the whole policy had been a mistake. These "self-governing territories" include Kwa-Zulu, KwaNdebele, Lebowa, QwaQwa and kaNgwane.

Taking account of the millions of South Africans living in the self-governing territories and the TBVC States, it is not surprising that the stream of financial assistance has grown to around 20 per cent of S.A.'s total Budget expenditure. What is astounding is the amount of money that has disappeared through incompetence and corruption—as the recent well-documented financial scandals in Lebowa and KwaNdebele have shown. There is no reason to believe that the entire system of statelets is not tainted in some degree.

Perhaps we should not be surprised. The administrative problems of the black States are no more than a microcosm of the same problems of bloated bureaucracy, overspending and corruption in S.A. itself. The great task of sorting out the mess is now being faced by Finance Minister Derek Keys. Not only is the S.A. economy in no condition to go on paying out money on a wasteful basis, but the condition of financial dependency will complicate the difficult task of negotiating the status of the black states in the new constitutional dispensation.

Revenue and Expenditure of TBVC States

	Rm									
	Transkei		Bophuthatswana		Venda		Ciskei		Total	
	1991/92	1992/93	1991/92	1992/93	1991/92	1992/93	1991/92	1992/93	1991/92	1992/93
<b>Income</b>										
Own Revenue	671	780	1,645	1,707	200	273	337	363	2,853	3,123
Transfer payments	906	1,004	921	1,055	165	171	372	391	2,364	2,621
Customs Union	502	556	868	998	139	134	267	267	1,776	1,955
Tax transfers	350	387	15	15	16	25	65	82	446	500
Monetary Area	34	36	15	17	5	6	9	11	63	70
R-for-R	20	25	23	25	5	6	31	31	79	87
<b>Expenditure</b>										
Budgetary assistance	1,546	1,720	879	954	555	585	672	711	3,652	3,970
Total revenue, transfers and budgetary assistance	3,123	3,504	3,445	3,716	920	1,029	1,414	1,502	8,902	9,751
Total current & capital expenditure	4,016	5,238	3,762	4,340	1,192	1,458	1,970	2,287	10,940	13,323
Deficit before borrowing	-893	-1,734	-317	-624	-272	-429	-556	-785	-2,038	-3,572
Surplus/deficit B/Fwd	73	60	206	34	36	—	33	84	348	178
Financing	880	1,674	145	218	286	429	523	701	1,834	3,022

## REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

FBIS-AFR-93-057  
26 March 1993

Bridging finance	647	1,591	—	—	226	359	493	621	1,366	2,571
Surplus/deficit	60	0	34	-372	50	0	0	0	144	-372
<b>1. Revised budget</b>										
<b>2. Approved budgets</b>										
<b>Source: Dept of State Expenditure</b>										

Not the least of the problems—as far as the TBVC States are concerned—is their independent constitutional status under S.A. law. This means the Department of Foreign Affairs is technically responsible for negotiations with them—though in practice, matters often seem to run on a basis which ignores the form of independence. To take the point further: whereas the brief of Pretoria's auditor-general still allows him to examine the probity of the finances of the self-governing states, he cannot have any jurisdiction at all over the TBVC states.

At first glance, an obvious and drastic means of bringing the TBVC group to heel would be simply to close the tap. The problem is that the corrupt elites would be the last to suffer as a result. They would make sure that, if resources are scarce, they would continue to live in the manner to which they have become accustomed. Financial pressure of this kind could also trigger instability—which greater S.A. can hardly afford in these times of extreme political delicacy.

The maddening thing is that, as long ago as the mid-Eighties, there was general recognition within the government that something needed to be done about the finances of the TBVC States. In 1986, joint financial adjustment committees were set up under the chairmanship of the Development Bank of Southern Africa

(DBSA) to improve the deployment of the limited funds available. Not only administrative efficiency and honesty, but also the ordering of spending priorities, fell within these committees' terms of reference.

The committees have now been in existence for over five years and DBSA GM Deon Richter claims they have done good work. The TBVC states are expected to run record deficits for 1992/1993 (Table 1), reflecting increased commitment to social spending more than any other factor—but things would probably have been much worse without the application of the committees. The TBVC states have established their status as borrowers in S.A. financial markets, by way of special arrangements with the S.A. government and have issued substantial quantities of paper which has been well received.

The effectiveness of the bilateral committee model inspired a decision to extend it to the self-governing states. In February 1992, the DBSA prepared a document setting out detailed proposals. "Cooperative agreements" have now been signed by all the governments of self-governing territories with the exception of Kwazulu.

(The scale of assistance to the self-governing states is set out in Table 2.)

**Assistance to Self-Governing States**

	Transfers							
	Current		Current		Capital		Total	
	1991/92	1990/92	1991/92	1990/92	1991/92	1990/92	1991/92	1990/92
Governments of Self-governing Territories	R'000	R'000	R'000	R'000	R'000	R'000	R'000	
Manpower assistance	189,174	163,917	—	—	—	—	189,174	163,917
Additional amount								
Social assistance allowances	—	—	167,750	—	—	—	167,750	—
Other assistance	—	—	5,076,022	3,555,668	227,964	790,504	5,303,986	4,346,172
Development assistance	—	—	100,000	—	—	—	100,000	—
Project aid	—	—	—	—	11,317	18,000	11,317	18,000
Statutory grants	—	—	655,534	601,820	—	—	655,534	601,820
Total estimated expenditure	189,174	163,917	5,999,306	4,157,488	239,281	808,504	6,427,761	5,129,909
Source: Dept of Finance								

There appears to be a general feeling within the Pretoria bureaucracy that the situation should be nursed along

until there is a constitutional settlement. This is the attitude of Finance Minister Keys. However, Keys is

rumoured to have instituted a "zero-base" budgetary procedure for S.A. itself. If this is indeed the case (and we won't have to wait long to find out), logic dictates the same procedure for the self-governing territories. This alone would do a power of good in bringing expenditure there under better control.

There are grave dangers in the attitude that everything is being done that can be done. But it is encouraging that prosecutions are at last being prepared against officials who have come under suspicion through the findings of the Parsons report on Lebowa and the De Meyer report on KwaNdebele.

Minister of Regional & Land Affairs Jacob de Villiers says both reports have been handed to the Transvaal attorney-general. In KwaNdebele, the attorney-general is leading a joint police investigation to prepare for prosecutions.

And several officials of the former Department of Development Aid are soon to appear in the Pretoria Regional Court on charges of fraud and corruption.

De Villiers also points out that those civil servants who mismanage their responsibilities and waste taxpayers' money will be properly disciplined, even if they are exonerated in court—because officials are expected to be "diligent and cautious" in the execution of their duties. If only such an ethos had been abroad in the S.A. ... De Villiers adds that the authority of the Ombudsman has been increased, while the status of the attorneys-general has been enhanced to help ensure good governance.

This attitude is highly commendable—but it is, after all, no more than should be expected in any well-governed State. Generally speaking, the S.A. government itself urgently needs to regain full credibility as an honest administrator.

This brings us to an important political issue affecting the transition generally. The fear has frequently been expressed within the business community that government and the ANC [African National Congress] are preparing a cosy bilateral deal which will mean that much of the dirt of the past will be swept under the mat. This outcome could be disastrous from the viewpoint of re-establishing confidence by overseas investors—the key to economic progress.

Not only this, but the two major players must resist the temptation to play politics with the issue of the black states. It would be all too easy for the ANC to gloat over government's dilemma and to play up all the old legitimate criticism of territorial apartheid.

But this could prove a two-edged sword. On the one hand, there is no love lost between black radicals and most of the governments of black states. On the other, Transkei's military dictator, Bantu Holomisa, could be regarded as a most equivocal ally (could he yet prove to be a dangerous rival to the ageing ANC leadership?).

There should be a community of interest between the ANC and the NP [National Party] to produce efficient and honest government everywhere in S.A. This implies that the ANC should support fully the current programme of joint committees, and further steps that might be taken to get an early grip on the problem.

As things stand, management of the adjustment process is being retained within the cosy self-sealing circle of the bureaucracies. Perhaps we should exercise some imagination and establish another form of joint committee—not judicial this time, but one involving key representatives of the private sector. These could well be business executives and representatives of the accounting and legal professions.

This form of committee could offer a novel type of input for the restructuring of central government itself, as well as that of the black states.

General confidence in administrative competence and honesty has sunk so low that a dramatic move of this sort is needed.

Historically speaking, there is room to argue that the conditions of administrative weakness which manifested themselves over the years were aggravated by the haste with which Pretoria withdrew civil servants seconded to the black states. This took place for ideological rather than practical reasons. It would, nevertheless, be the height of political folly to conclude that blacks were incapable of effective administration.

The outgoing director-general of the Department of State Expenditure (DSE), Henry Kluever, says there are many highly capable, honest and dedicated black civil servants in the national states. According to one insider, the KwaZulu and QwaQwa administrations are two which are regarded as generally efficient and competent.

Government has just announced that all education departments, including those of the self-governing territories, will be absorbed into one national department. This could foreshadow similar moves with health and perhaps other areas of administration.

Even so, the flow of money to the homelands will continue for some time, whatever form the black states eventually take under a new constitution.

The TBVC states have sovereign powers and duties which will become regionalised: the self-governing territories will fall under S.A., but they will most probably retain significant responsibilities.

The point is that whatever administrative structures replace the present jigsaw, they must be made accountable—preferably to a parliament in which the tradition of resignation for ministerial incompetence has been firmly restored.

**\* Right-Wingers Said Buying Land in Mozambique**

93AF0405A Johannesburg *THE WEEKLY MAIL* in English 15 Jan 93 p 3

[Article by Eddie Koch and Arthur Gavshon]

[Text] Rightwingers from South Africa are colonising parcels of land in deserted rural areas of Mozambique so that they can set up farming and tourism projects.

At least one of these schemes involves a bizarre plan to create a small white homeland in the former Marxist state.

A range of far-right splinter groups, disillusioned by moves to end apartheid at home, are expanding into Mozambique by offering the Frelimo government farming and business skills needed to rebuild a country devastated by 15 years of civil war.

Some groups have entered into secret pacts with Mozambique's rightwing rebel movement, Renamo, to make sure that their plans succeed. Contacts with the Renamo leadership were made, in some cases, through South African Defence Force [SADF] officers involved in supplying clandestine aid to the rebels during the late 1980s.

Details about one of the more controversial projects surfaced in London last month when a man called Danie Oosthuysen, once a senior member of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging and a close friend of its leader, Eugene Terre'Blanche, fled the United Kingdom after being picked up by British security agents on suspicion of buying arms for the AWB [Afrikaner Resistance Movement].

Oosthuysen left a pile of documents in his London hotel room which show that he was trying to raise investment capital for a multi-million dollar project that would have given the rightwinger a large chunk of land in Mozambique's Gaza province in exchange for upgrading the area (see accompanying story).

The documents reveal that Oosthuysen's company based in the northern Transvaal town of Pietersburg, the Sub-Sahara Development Co, has been secretly dealing with the leadership of Renamo while negotiating with the government of Mozambique.

"It is the company's firm belief, after initial contact with Remano (sic) that the security of the company's property and personnel will not be jeopardised in anyway... At no stage must the government of Mozambique be informed that Renamo supports this scheme," says a memo contained in the documents.

Oosthuysen's scheme is just the latest in a series of controversial projects being set up by members of South Africa's far-right in Mozambique.

—In 1989 Colonel Gert Otto, commander of the SADF's security operations in the Kruger National Park, set up a company called the Mozambique Assistance and

Investment Corporation (Mozaic) with plans to develop a large game reserve on the Mozambique side of Kruger.

A senior officer in the South African Police told *THE WEEKLY MAIL* that Otto had extensive dealings with Renamo, supplying the rebels with arms and supplies until as late as 1989, while he was settling up the company.

One of the colonel's stated objectives, according to the company's mission statement, was to "provide productive security information to the security community."

The SADF officer's plans were scuttled when he was transferred from his post in the Kruger Park to the northern Transvaal. Some of Otto's men were using their contacts with Renamo to smuggle tusks from elephants poached in Mozambique into South Africa.

—In the middle of last year Mozambican wildlife officers foiled plans by a consortium of South African businessmen—including a member of the AWB convicted of fraud and dealing in illicit diamonds—to bulldoze a coral reef off an island in the Bazaruto archipelago so that they could build an upmarket tourist resort there.

The plan was aborted by ecologists working for the Mozambican government.

—An even more bizarre project in Mozambique involves an offshoot of the militant Wit Wolwe called the Israelites.

Jan Taljaard reports that the Israelites, a fanatical religious sect with extreme rightwing views, have set up a chapter in Mozambique with the idea of creating a small all-white enclave in the southern province of Maputo.

The Israelites believe that members of the white race are the descendants of the tribes of Israel and that all other races, including blacks and Jews, are sub-human. The sect's members appear to be unconcerned that Mozambique is ruled by a black government—even though they refer to Africans as "members of the mud races" or "crownless animals of the field."

Eddie von Maltitz, one-time leader of the Boereweerstandsbeweging (BWB) and now head of an organisation called Resistance Against Communism, says he has been asked by Israeli members to help run a dairy farm they have established near Maputo (See Page 10).

Terre'Blanche this week told Mozambican journalists he was aware of plans by various rightwing groups to settle on land but said his organisation was not interested in this project. "The fact is that if I had a single rand I would use it to buy bullets, not land." Terre'Blanche is quoted as saying by the Mozambican newsletter, MEDIAFAX.

These groups are able to get into Mozambique because the authorities there are desperate to raise foreign investment capital.

Large tracts of land in the country's hinterland have been left fallow for many years because millions of villagers and peasant farmers have fled to large towns and the relatively safe coastline to escape Renamo attacks.

Abdul Adamo, former director of Mozambique's Department of Wildlife and Forestry, says his government encourages South Africans to invest in productive business projects in South Africa but that each scheme is examined by the Mozambican cabinet before being approved.

Augusto Sumburane, director of the Office for Foreign Investment Promotion in Maputo, told MEDIAFAX that there were four projects formally approved by his office which involved farmers from South Africa.

One thousand hectares have been granted to Mozambicans who have entered into "joint ventures" with the South Africans for cattle and cotton farming. Some of the deals involve the import of farming equipment in exchange for land. There are no indications that these projects are linked in any way to the rightwing schemes.

Government officials in Maputo say it is easy for foreigners to obtain access to land without going through official channels by getting Mozambicans to act as fronts for them.

Mozambican officials say there has been a recent rush for land and business contracts in their country by South Africans as it appears that the ceasefire between Renamo and government forces will hold. "There are many more proposals from South Africa but most are not serious," said Sumburane.

There is concern in some government departments that thousands of Mozambicans will return to their rural homes to find their land occupied by white Afrikaners and that this will become a source of serious social conflict in the future.

#### **Renamo Link in Plan to Buy in Gaza Area**

Documents seized by MI5 last month from two South Africans allegedly involved in an illicit arms deal indicate a desperate attempt by rightwingers to secure a chunk of land in Gaza province, Mozambique.

The prospectus formulated by the Sub-Saharan Development Company—offshoot of a group named Soundprops Investment 1145 Pty Ltd of Pietersburg—describes the area in question, promises the programme has the backing of Renamo leaders and will be protected by Renamo guerrillas.

In the prospectus, the company's managing director, Danie J Oosthuysen (also referred to as Oosthuizen in the document), notes: "The company has no intention of becoming involved in the dispute between Renamo (sic)

and Frelimo. The fact that most of the Remano (sic) guerrillas in the area will be employed by the company would serve as a stabilising factor."

Mentioned in the prospectus are these intentions:

- Extensive cattle ranching for beef production, wildlife conservation and management in the first phase of a development scheme that sets 20 years at a time span for repaying interest on loans and completing the programme.
- The establishment of a centrally located meat processing factory in the second phase.
- Restoration and upgrading of the railway linking Zimbabwe with the Gaza development region and Maputo in the third phase.

Between one and three million hectares would be needed for the development, according to the prospectus.

A Gaza under the sway of latter-day bitterreinders could provide a highly useful fall-back area if anything resembling a white homeland were to arise on the South African side of the border.

In his presentation to Mozambique's Office for the Promotion of Foreign Investment (OPFI), Oosthuysen does not mention plans for co-operation with Renamo or his expectation of the support of the rebel movement.

He makes clear that his company expects the allocation of land would vest full ownership in the developers. Only when full and final agreement is reached would capital be raised, although an amount of \$85-million had been pledged in principle by an unnamed investment group. All equipment and livestock brought into the development area would need to be exempted from duties or taxes for five years, and income taxes would not be levied on the company for the first 10 years of operation.

Acknowledging the approach, OPFI deputy director Jose Julai Mazive wrote from Maputo in January last year: "I am pleased to inform you that your project is, in principle, acceptable. However, to give you the final decision it is necessary to present a viable project proposal with a guarantee of abstention (sic) of related financement."

\* Poll Assesses Government Preferences, Attitudes

#### **Federal System Preferred**

93AF0404A Cape Town WEEKEND ARGUS in English 23/24 Jan 93 p 16

[Article by Frans Esterhuyse: "Federalism on the Cards"; first paragraph WEEKEND ARGUS comment]

[Text] A federal system, in a constitution spelling out a clear division of powers between central and regional governments, may be on the cards for South Africa if a new attitude survey of opinion-leaders reflects the future political direction. But there are forces that could disrupt the process.

## REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

FBIS-AFR-93-057

26 March 1993

Constitution-making in South Africa appears to be heading for a federal system based on a compromise between conflicting viewpoints.

But the transition process is being threatened by continuing violence and political intolerance.

This emerges from the latest findings in a study of attitudes among political opinion-leaders by the Stellenbosch University Centre for International and Comparative Politics.

The researchers found that a decisive majority—68 percent—of opinion-leaders, including some within the liberation movements, favoured a federal system.

Resistance to federalism was found mainly among supporters of the ANC-SACP [African National Congress-South African Communist Party] and the PAC [Pan Africanist Congress].

The survey report, released to **WEEKEND ARGUS** today, says for supporters of all the parliamentary parties, except the CP [Conservative Party], the first choice by a considerable margin is federation. The figures vary from 85 percent for the NP [National Party] to 81 percent for the DP [Democratic Party].

Most supporters (85 percent) of the Indian parties also prefer a federal model, and so do 96 percent of Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) supporters.

Of CP members and supporters of other rightwing groups, 66 percent gave partition as their first choice, while 17 percent preferred a model of white domination.

Other survey results show that 75 percent of the ANC-SACP respondents and 44.8 percent of PAC supporters chose a unitary state model.

In both organisations there were opinion leaders who supported a class state—in which the black working class controlled the central government.

Project leader Professor Hennie Kotze notes in his report that a relatively high number of ANC-SACP-orientated respondents (16 percent) and PAC-orientated respondents (17 percent) put a federal model as their first choice.

Looking at second choices, it emerges that a unitary state is preferred by 65 percent of the NP, 76 percent of the DP and 79 percent of the IFP. In the case of the ANC-SACP, 41 percent indicate federation as their second choice.

"It is clear once again that the differences between the parties are not so deep that some kind of compromise on a model could not be reached," says Professor Kotze.

He notes that the ANC-SACP has already expressed its support for elected regional bodies and that it appears it will be possible for the most important parties to reach a compromise on regional government powers.

(In the survey questionnaire a federal system was defined as a system "dividing South Africa into a number of multiracial regions vested with considerable autonomy, but at a central level a mixed parliament with proportional representation, a Bill of Rights, and checks and balances on the executive branch of government.")

Attitudes revealed in the survey results also indicate that compromise is possible on the controversial issues of "power-sharing" and the protection of minority rights.

The majority of respondents who support the parliamentary parties find proposed minority protection devices for the constitution acceptable, while the ANC-SACP and the PAC find these devices highly unacceptable.

The report says that although the NP has moved away from the protection of group rights to support for the view that individual rights must be protected, there is still a fear that groups such as whites, coloureds and Indians will be "overwhelmed."

"The real test for a new constitution is thus not only whether the majority approves, but whether the minority is going to accept it."

On the issue of political violence and intolerance, the survey report says the high levels of intolerance among certain opinion-leaders reveal "a pattern which spells danger."

"In fact, a great deal of the violence could possibly be ascribed to this very high degree of intolerance among certain groups."

"Tolerance is a prerequisite for a democratic society."

The report says one of the greatest threats to South Africa's transition and to the creation of a climate of reconciliation is the continuing violence.

On the issue of affirmative action, involving the inclusion of additional large numbers of blacks in the civil service, the response of opinion-leaders was largely positive.

The rightwing groups were the only respondents who disagreed, saying the state did not have to appoint more black people to the civil service.

### **Transition Prospects Viewed**

*93AF0404B Cape Town WEEKEND ARGUS in English 23/24 Jan 93 p 18*

[Article by Frans Esterhuysen: "Intolerance Is Bedeviling Peace"; first paragraph **WEEKEND ARGUS** comment]

[Text] A high-level political research project has revealed some disturbing trends in the attitudes of people who ought to be leading us out of the doldrums. But the researchers also found hopeful signs of possible early progress in South Africa's peace process.

Levels of political intolerance among opinion-leaders are "disturbingly high," a new study of attitudes among South Africa's national elite has found.

The researchers warn that this factor, together with a continuation of the current level of political violence, could retard South Africa's transition process and even put election plans in jeopardy.

They recommend—in a survey report released to WEEKEND ARGUS today—a concerted effort by all political groupings as well as the state to launch programmes for reducing political intolerance.

The study, based on attitude surveys among opinion-leaders across a wide spectrum, has been conducted by the Centre for International and Comparative Politics at the University of Stellenbosch. The project leader is Professor Hennie Kotze, head of the university's political science department.

The highest intolerance levels among opinion-leaders in political groupings were found to be supporters of right-wing parties—with an intolerance tendency of 73.9 percent, measured according to a tolerance index.

Almost 48 percent of right-wingers—the highest of all groups—fall in the category of "extremely intolerant."

Inkatha Freedom Party respondents also showed a high level of intolerance (52.1 percent), followed by supporters of the Indian parties (40.9 percent), the National Party (37.2 percent), the PAC (28.5 percent) and the ANC-SACP [African National Congress-South Africa Communist Party] (15.7 percent).

The most tolerant of all political groupings was the Democratic Party with an intolerance level of only 8.1 percent and a tolerance level of 83.1 percent. (8.8 percent were uncertain).

A disturbing aspect of the findings is that among leaders questioned in various sectors of society, those in the military establishment—included for the first time in such a survey—were found to be politically the most intolerant (67.5 percent), followed by farmers (52.9 percent), labour (40.9 percent), churches (33.3 percent) and the bureaucracy (31.3 percent).

However, in a survey to test support for political parties among opinion-leaders, those in the military sector showed the strongest support for the National Party (93 percent), followed by agriculture (76 percent) and parastatal institutions (68 percent).

With such a strong identification with the party which initiated transition in South Africa, it seems likely that the military will, in fact, submit to compromises negotiated by the NP [National Party] on the path towards a more democratic state.

Other significant findings include:

—No fewer than 68 percent of all respondents preferred a federal system of government as a first constitutional choice, with a "unitary state" the second choice. Only four percent preferred "partition" and a paltry two percent chose "white domination."

—More than 75 percent of the ANC-SACP supporters among respondents and 49 percent of the PAC [Pan Africanist Congress] supporters placed a unitary model as their first choice, while 96 percent of IFP [Inkatha Freedom Party] supporters joined the majority of NP, DP [Democratic Party] and supporters of the Indian parties when it came to "federalism" as a first-choice model.

—With the exception of Conservative Party supporters, the majority of respondents have no problems in accepting liberal constitutional devices such as a Bill of Rights, judicial review, regular elections, a guaranteed multi-party system, and proportional representation.

—State control is rejected as an economic model by supporters of the ANC-SACP who place themselves predominantly in the "mixed economy" category (57.5 percent). PAC respondents showed relatively strong support for a policy of state control.

—Affirmative action as a policy programme for the civil service is acceptable by a majority of all groups, with the exception of right-wing supporters.

The researchers conclude that if the climate of violence continues at its present level, the transition process—and with it any planned election date late in 1993 or early 1994—will come under tremendous pressure.

It is only when the Peace Accord has a real impact that the violence will decline and the trust needed for binding agreements will have a chance to grow.

"A concerted effort to get programmes started to reduce intolerance should be made by all political groupings as well as the state," said Professor Kotze.

Progress in the transition process will depend on two factors:

—The emergence of strong leaders on the side of the ANC-SACP who have the ability to impose unpleasant compromises, and

—The ability of the cohesive white elite also to accept unpalatable concessions.

Indications are that an elite settlement coupled with pact-forming cannot be arranged in a "democratic or mass-media fishbowl."

An important factor that could become a driving force in the transition process is the realisation that the government (the NP and supporters of the "core state") on its own is not strong enough to provide the necessary economic growth and strong government. At the same

time the challengers (ANS-SACP and PAC) are also not strong enough to enforce a "people's democracy."

Meanwhile, the immediate policy priorities of any government—transitional or permanent, and regardless of party-political composition—will be to effect political stability and economic reconstruction.

The end result of the process may be a limited democracy, the report says.

#### \* Expansion of Electricity Network Detailed

*93AF0402B Johannesburg ENGINEERING WEEK in English 22 Jan 93 p 5*

[Article by Howard Whitehead, executive director of the Durban Electricity Service: "Electrification in South Africa—A Way Forward"]

[Text] Electricity distribution has, apart from its early beginnings, always been the responsibility of local government and credit must go to that sector for the significant development of urban electrification.

Over the last 40 years or so, political boundaries have placed a tight constraint on natural development of networks. In addition, the introduction of the Two Clerk's Remuneration Act in 1985 caused a rapid growth in the number of municipal undertakings as the grading of the municipality and hence the two clerk's remuneration was influenced by the operation of an electricity undertaking.

This caused further fragmentation in an already fragmented industry. The electricity undertaking has also always been seen as another source of income and in spite of attempts to limit or control the contribution to rates, this varies considerably from place to place.

#### Politics

In the political sense electricity supply is a powerbase, no pun intended, in which there are considerable vested interests. From the customer's point of view, certain customer groups have used electricity services as a political football.

Mass actions, however, have not always been politically driven. More basic reasons such as appalling service and the poor or complete absence of a credible billing system have been the underlying cause.

Local government has been empowered to set its own tariffs within its borough boundaries, hence there is a vast number of different tariffs and tariff structures throughout S.A. This in itself, is a hindrance to change and in many instances gives rise to customer complaints.

Electricity supply to less privileged consumer groups is usually not considered to be viable and this, coupled with the perception of an unwillingness to pay for the

energy, results in a lack of interest on the part of successful neighbouring undertakings to venture into that market.

There is a fundamental moral issue here, as well. For years, white have enjoyed the benefit of having sound industrial consumers as part of their electricity undertakings, whilst the black dormitory towns turned, almost overnight, into somewhat isolated local authorities with a poor customer base.

Surely, in the moral context at least, they are simply suburbs of the towns and cities in which they work and should be treated as any white suburb with the same service and tariffs?

The lack of a business approach to electricity supply sees a distinct absence of a customer focus in the case of many local authorities.

The fragmentation of this industry has resulted in the sub-optimal use of resources. Considerable multiplication of resources exists, including human (both technical and administrative) as well as billing systems, workshop and test facilities.

There is general agreement that the industry should be restructured on a regional basis with fewer undertakings and that it should be depoliticised. That of course, is easier said than done!

Firstly, there is many a politician who would disagree with depoliticisation and secondly, is there any political will to change? Is there a way forward?

The whole issue is complicated by the political changes taking place in S.A. However, in view of the importance of the task in terms of contributing to the economic kickstart of the country, a way must be found.

It is essential therefore, to find a way forward within the current political framework.

The year '94 seems to be targeted as a watershed year in South African history, but we cannot sit and wait for change. It is in all our interests to do whatever is necessary to get electrification underway now.

#### Evolutionary Approach

Perhaps there is a way to engender an evolutionary approach, particularly in the large urban areas, which will result in the merging of some of the less viable undertakings with larger viable undertakings with strong industrial customer bases.

At this juncture, the issue of economic viability needs to be discussed. If one examines the cost of extending any existing local authority system to a new township development, in terms of receiving an acceptable rate of return on that capital investment at current capital costs, a higher tariff than the standard would need to be charged.

In effect, the local authority pools all costs and charges a common tariff to all customers. In other words, the older consumers end up paying more than they perhaps should do if prices were determined on a fragmented basis.

With limited technical and administrative skills, usually through the offices of a central government department such as the Department of Development Aid, electricity networks have been built up.

Being unable to charge more than the adjacent undertaking, these operations have not been economically viable from the word go. This has been the result of a political ideal and we are now faced with the problem of turning these undertakings into viable operations.

On the "up" side however, the merging of two networks invariably provides a better overall load factor than operating each separately, provided the benefit of diversity is obtainable from the supplier, an improved cost per unit can be achieved.

The further effect of such steps would, in the longer term, be negated as Eskom would lose income and would have to adjust its tariffs upwards.

However, one would expect that the benefits of the synergy of the merger would have begun to accrue and the financial position of the undertaking should not be adversely affected.

As an example, in the Durban area where some 48 authorities are supplied by the one undertaking, very competitive tariffs have been achieved without even having the benefit of generation.

Admittedly, the application of "Time of Use" tariffs would, to a large extent, negate this benefit but perhaps there is a way of offering an incentive.

#### **Legislated or Voluntary Merging**

On the subject of merging, the question arises as to whether this should be voluntary or legislated from above.

Taking into account the unlikelihood of sweeping legislative change, the government has the mechanics in place for local government to voluntarily co-operate. I quote from the speech of Leon Wessels, minister of Local Government and National Housing during a meeting of the Council for the Co-ordinating of Local Government Affairs in Cape Town on 27 March 1992:

"The Interim Measures for Local Government Act (Act 128 of 1991) is probably one of the most important mechanisms created to give local authorities, wishing to

co-operate on a voluntary basis, the opportunity to, amongst others, establish joint administrations or amalgamated local authorities by way of negotiations."

To sound a note of warning however, success on a voluntary basis has not had a good track record. In 1972 the British government endeavoured to form a Greater London Council on a voluntary basis but ultimately had to step in and legislate boundaries. Toronto, Canada had a similar experience in the 70s.

The minister also indicated that, "where this does not take place spontaneously, specific fiscal measures will be taken to encourage it—January 1993 appears to be a realistic target date." Although there is some opposition to this legislation, a curtain has been raised on the scene in so far as politicians are concerned. However, there are a number of issues to be dealt with which are either hindering the process or perhaps could assist it. These include the Town Clerk's remuneration Act, the contribution to rates, a lack of acceptance for the need to electrify S.A., a lack of trust and common objective, non-standard tariffs, and Eskom tariffs.

In any action plan, there is a need for a champion of the cause to ensure its success. Who, might you ask, would champion this cause? The matter has come to the attention of the minister of Local Government and Housing, as well as the minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs who has prepared a Cabinet Memorandum on the matter.

#### **Government Responsibility**

It is the responsibility of central government to move the process forward to the ultimate benefit of all South Africans.

To succeed, however, at this delicate stage of our political history, proper involvement and consultation must take place on a broad scale.

There must be no point scoring or hidden agendas and should initiatives be taken from other quarters such as the ANC [African National Congress], participation is essential in pursuance of the common goal.

There is no doubt that we need to move towards Regional Undertakings which are likely to remain in the hands of local government, whether or not that takes some metropolitan form in the future or not.

It is necessary, however, for the central government to drive this process along and for the players at local level to seize the initiative, taking cognisance of the absolute essentialness of electrification and making a personal commitment to achieving that common objective. In that way, they will make a significant contribution to S.A.'s future.

**Angola****UNITA, U.S. Delegation Begin Talks 25 Mar****UNITA Official 'Optimistic'**

*AB2503224293 Abidjan La Chaine Une Television Network in French 2000 GMT 25 Mar 93*

[Text] An Angolan delegation of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola [UNITA] is on a visit to our country. Yesterday, they met the president and since this morning, they have been holding discussions with an American delegation. Levy Niamkey has details.

[Niamkey] The American delegation is led by the new deputy assistant secretary of state for African Affairs, Mr. Davidow. Talks with UNITA, which have been going on since this morning, will continue this afternoon and tomorrow. The aim of the Americans is to help in the resumption of inter-Angolan negotiations, which are deadlocked. The UNITA delegation is led by its information minister, Dr. Jorge Valentim, and comprises four other UNITA members as well as UNITA's West African representatives. UNITA's presence here follows that of the Angolan Government a few days ago. The head of the delegation, Dr. Valentim, gave us an update on the situation.

[Begin recording] [Valentim] We have been in Abidjan for the past 48 hours. We were nicely received by the Ivorian Government, and even yesterday we were received by the president, who gave us some advice and whom we briefed on the general situation in Angola. Today at around 1030, we started discussions with the American delegation. This morning, we presented the situation as we saw it: what we felt the solutions should be as well as some practical proposals for a political solution to the Angolan situation. This afternoon, we heard the comments of the Americans and we started the talks.

[Niamkey] Without our being too indiscreet, could you tell us the proposals that you wish to make to resolve the crisis?

[Valentim] We have observed that there is a lack of understanding in Angola, and we believe that the best solution for the moment is the formation of a transition government or a provisional government, which could be in power for some years and which will be a representative government. At the same time, it will be necessary to have a very extensive administrative decentralization. This will serve as an intermediate means of resolving the Angolan problem.

[Niamkey] You are presently meeting with the Americans, why the Americans in particular, and what proposals are they making to you?

[Valentim] The Americans because they are the observers at the Bicesse talks and at the same time a member of the Security Council. They took this initiative because, I believe—this is our point of view—I believe they want to contribute in a practical manner.

Because the other meetings were poorly prepared, I believe the Americans want to make a more valid contribution to the discussions. The most important thing is not to meet the delegation of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, but rather to find a more appropriate platform for discussion; that is, we must have a well-prepared meeting.

[Niamkey] Are you optimistic?

[Valentim] We are optimistic. We came to inform as well as listen to advice and present our solutions. [end recording]

**UNITA Delegation Meets U.S. Envoy**

*MB2503202093 London BBC World Service in English 1830 GMT 25 Mar 93*

[From the "Focus on Africa" program]

[Text] While the war has raged on in Angola with continuing fighting especially in the north, a delegation from UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] has been meeting the United States envoy, Jeffrey Davidow, in the Ivory Coast capital, Abidjan. Until now, it has been difficult to get UNITA to meet anybody. The last attempt of talks between UNITA and the MPLA government in Addis Ababa last month came to nothing when UNITA failed to turn out. On the line to Abidjan, Akwe Amosu asked UNITA's United States representative Jardo Muecalia how had the talks with Mr. Davidow come about.

[Begin recording] [Muecalia] Yes, of course, this is a meeting that is taking place after the secretary of state, Mr. Warren Christopher, requested the two delegations, one from America and the other one from UNITA met here. [sentence as heard] We [word indistinct] UNITA delegation came out and of course now the meeting with the U.S. delegation is taking place as part of an effort we are making to take to the international community our concerns, as well as our ideas of solving the Angolan crisis. So, I think this is the first step which I must say, this morning the meetings went very well. We started off presenting to the American delegation our concerns.

[Amosu] Were you putting to Mr. Davidow particular proposals that you think might solve the crisis in Angola?

[Muecalia] We will be .... [changes thought] Of course, we haven't finished yet, and because of that, I am afraid, I will not be able to get into details. But let me just say that it is going very well and at the end of these meetings—I do not know exactly when, it may be tomorrow or the day after—there will be a much more specific press conference that will deal with details. As of now, I am afraid, I must say, we are beginning the process. It is going very well, and we hope that something very, very constructive will come out of these meetings.

[Amosu] It has been reported that a delegation from the Angolan Government arrived today in Abidjan. Are they likely to be part of this process?

[Muecalia] I must say I am not aware of their delegation. It was not planned. So, we will have to find out what is going on, but we are not aware of it.

[Amosu] But you would be willing to meet if it works out and the Americans were happy to help facilitate such meetings? Would you be willing to meet the MPLA delegation?

[Muecalia] I think what I must say is that this whole process we started here is exactly to resume the negotiation process. We found out with the last accord that one should not rush into things. The most important is that there is an agreement. It is important that people's concerns, people's positions are understood, and of course, it takes [words indistinct] it has to be part of a process.

[Amosu] There have been some suggestions that the Americans have told UNITA that this is a last ditch attempt and that if nothing comes out of this meeting, the U.S. [word indistinct] recognize the MPLA-led government. Is there any truth in that?

[Muecalia] I must say that there is no truth in that. There was no such ultimatum or such threats made to us nor in this delegation, neither in Washington, where I am coming from. Of course, everyone is concerned about the situation in Angola. We feel the urgency of solving it, but I will repeat myself: We need to find identified problems and find solutions that will in fact produce a long, lasting peace. [end recording]

#### **Manuvakola Comments**

*LD2503194393 Lisbon RDP Antena 1 Radio Network in Portuguese 1800 GMT 25 Mar 93*

[Interview with General Eugenio Manuvakola, head of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) delegation in talks with U.S. officials in Abidjan, by correspondent Walter Medeiros, place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Manuvakola] We had the first session of talks this morning at 1030, and a second one at 1530.

[Medeiros] General, what peace proposals have you put to the United States?

[Manuvakola] Well. We have expounded on the real situation of the crisis and the feelings of the Angolan people which have gone out of focus internationally due to biased information from the Luanda government.

[Medeiros] But what concrete proposals have you put on the table?

[Manuvakola] Well, our talks are still developing; it has so far been an information meeting on our feelings about the crisis. So it is not really a question of proposals because we are not negotiating, we are holding a working and information meeting. This is a very necessary phase indeed for a better preparation of the negotiations.

[Medeiros] U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jeffrey Davidow has stated that any negotiated solution must necessarily take in the Bicesse [peace accords]. Do you agree with this attitude?

[Manuvakola] Well, we have never reneged on Bicesse. All we are saying is that the present crisis situation means that new elements have arisen in the conflict that cannot be ignored and deserve the attention of both the Angolans and the international community. We need therefore to establish a climate of national harmony to ensure security and safeguard every Angolan's right to life.

[Medeiros] What will be the UN role? What role do you want for the United Nations in Angola henceforth?

[Manuvakola] Well, we are still elaborating on our exchange of information, so I cannot comment on that at the moment. Only at the end will we be able to comment.

[Medeiros] Do you think you might meet the Angolan Government soon?

[Manuvakola] That is what we are preparing here. The preparations have begun. The MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] has been sending diplomatic delegations abroad seeking support for its side of the dispute. We have only just now undertaken that kind of diplomatic and informative demarche, and would like to be allowed a minimum of time to conduct our affairs.

#### **Government Spokesman Denies Attendance**

*LD2503182393 Lisbon Radio Renascenca in Portuguese to Europe 1700 GMT 25 Mar 93*

[Text] The spokesman for the Presidency of the Angolan Government has just denied to us the presence of an Angolan Government delegation in Abidjan. This is what he said:

[Begin spokesman Vaz da Conceicao recording] No, that is not true. The Angolan Government has not been invited to attend the meeting. It is a bilateral meeting between the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola [UNITA] and the U.S. Administration. Up to this moment there is no government delegation in Abidjan. [end recording]

That was Angolan Government spokesman Vaz da Conceicao doing his duty of denying the obvious. In effect, we are in a position to confirm—based on the authority of Catholic Church sources in Abidjan—that Faustino Muteka and Higino Carneiro are indeed in Abidjan and are prepared to enter into negotiations at a moment's notice.

**General Staff: War To Reach 'Alarming Proportions'**

*MB2503213793 Luanda Radio Nacional Network in Portuguese 1900 GMT 25 Mar 93*

[Interview with General Joao de Matos, chief of the General Staff of the Angolan Armed Forces, by unidentified reporter in Dundo, Cuanza Norte Province, on 25 March—recorded]

[Text] General Joao de Matos, chief of the General Staff of the Angolan Armed Forces, said at the end of a visit to Dundo in Cuanza Norte Province, today, that the war in Angola could reach alarming proportions because of the intention by the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola [UNITA] to divide the country.

[Matos] I have come here to familiarize myself with the concrete situation in the field. I have come here to transmit some instructions to our troops in this area and to familiarize myself with the general situation of our troops here in Cuanza Norte Province.

[Reporter] What is the military situation in the field, after the taking of Caxito?

[Matos] The military situation in the country continues to be tense. The war continues to be more intense throughout the country, particularly in the central part of the country. Intense clashes are under way in central Angola, in Bie, Cubal, and Menongue, and we think that the war could reach very alarming proportions in the (?coming days).

[Reporter] How do you view [words indistinct] the present situation in the country?

[Matos] The [words indistinct] situation is serious. It is serious and it is going to get worse.

[Reporter] International media say that [words indistinct] clashes in Ndalatando or government troops may have already occupied the city. Can you confirm this?

[Matos] You are [words indistinct].

[Reporter] In one of his statements, Jonas Savimbi said that there are mercenaries fighting at the side of the government forces. Can you confirm this?

[Matos] That is a lie. As is usually the case, Jonas Savimbi likes to deceive the Angolan and international communities. He just wants to justify the presence of South African and other mercenaries who continue to support him. They are the main promoters of this war against our people.

[Reporter] Are the Angolan Armed Forces [FAA] determined to reoccupy the cities occupied by Jonas Savimbi's forces [words indistinct]?

[Matos] A fundamental task of the FAA forces is to guarantee the defense of the territorial integrity [words indistinct].

[Reporter] Savimbi says Huambo will never again belong to the government and UNITA will never again be in Luanda?

[Matos] These are divisionist tendencies within UNITA which do not correspond to our people's desire. We defend the existence of one Angola from Cabinda to Cunene Provinces, and we stand for the territorial integrity of our country.

**Government-UNITA Clashes Continue****Operations in Cuanza Sul Reported**

*MB2503205693 Jamba Voz da Resistencia do Galo Negro in Portuguese 1900 GMT 25 Mar 93*

[Excerpts] In Bie Province, the Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola [FALA] are [word indistinct] advancing toward the city of Bie. Clashes are currently under way in [words indistinct] governor's palace with FALA forces scoring victory. [passage omitted]

At Vila Flor Ward in Gabela Ward, Cuanza Sul Province, [word indistinct] clashes took place. Combined forces of Jose Eduardo dos Santos—the People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola [FAPLA], the Riot Police, and mercenaries—suffered major losses. Our correspondent Kassonga Kangola reports:

[Begin Kangola recording] On 20 March 1993, our armed forces, the brave FALA fighters [words indistinct] Jose Eduardo dos Santos' forces at Vila Flor Ward in Gabela Ward [words indistinct] FAPLA, the Riot Police, [words indistinct]. Our forces captured two weapons [words indistinct] and two [word indistinct] vehicles—Ifa and Toyota. [passage indistinct] [end recording]

In Lunda Sul, a combined FAPLA-Riot Police battalion was repulsed by FALA forces when it tried to reoccupy [name indistinct], 20 km south of the city of Saurimo, on 22 March. Our correspondent in the area reported today that six government soldiers died in the attack and a quantity of war materiel was captured, including 60-mm shells, RPG-7's, and rounds of ammunition. At about 1230 on the same day, FALA forces burned two FAPLA vehicles along Machequele-(Cachiuwa) road, 88 km east of the city of Saurimo. The vehicles—one IFA, registration No. ABA-94 and a Toyota registration No. AA-14116—were transporting government soldiers. Five of these soldiers lost their lives.

In Cuanza Norte Province, the combined FAPLA-Riot Police and FALA forces clashed, resulting in heavy human and material losses among government soldiers. [passage omitted]

**UNITA Claims Capture of Cuito Suburbs**

*MB2503120393 Johannesburg Channel Africa Radio in English 1100 GMT 25 Mar 93*

[Text] The UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] movement in Angola says its forces

have occupied five suburbs of the city of Cuito, the capital of the central Bie Province, after heavy fighting with government forces. Earlier reports said UNITA had managed to enter the city and had occupied one suburb. UNITA said its forces have seized large quantities of weapons, ammunition, and heavy artillery. It said 24 UNITA soldiers were released from prison.

UNITA said heavy battles were taking place around Soyo, and its soldiers were still in control of an undetermined number of oil fields. It said foreign journalists who wanted to visit Soyo would be welcome.

UNITA said a group of government soldiers who had crossed into Zaire to attack UNITA positions from the rear had been captured by the Zairian Army. It said heavy fighting was also taking place in the northern Cuanza Norte Province, where 15 government soldiers were killed near the provincial capital city of Ndalaatando.

#### FAPLA Battalion Destroyed in Cuanza Norte

*MB2503120693 Jamba Voz da Resistencia do Galo Negro in Portuguese 0600 GMT 25 Mar 93*

[Text] A People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola [FAPLA] battalion was destroyed yesterday. A FAPLA unit on patrol in a National Union for the Total Independence of Angola [UNITA] area of Cuanza Norte Province, was involved in the movement of helicopter-borne troops from Cambambe to (Nyangayapete), 7 km southeast of the city of Ndalaatando. FALA completely neutralized the operation.

As a result of the FALA action, the enemy abandoned on the ground 20 dead soldiers, 20 AKM rifles, two PKM machine guns, four RPG-7 rockets, one Racal military communications radio, as well as foodstuffs and medicines given to FAPLA and Riot Police forces by the World Food Program and the WHO. According to our correspondent, the foodstuffs and medicines were diverted from famine-stricken civilians affected by the war. The diversion of foodstuffs and medicines by the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola is happening at a time when UNITA is appealing to international organizations to assist Angolans regardless of their political affiliation.

#### Commentary Notes Observer 'Complacency' Toward UNITA

*MB2503100593 Luanda Radio Nacional Network in Portuguese 1100 GMT 24 Mar 93*

[From the "Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockrel" program]

[Text] The ambiguous nature of (?American) diplomacy became apparent early on. The fact that the observers became quiet before elections, despite flagrant violations of the Bicesse Accords, was symptomatic. This, plus the fact that one public [as heard] conveyed one position, while professing another political position in the national (?workshops) and behind the scenes. Everything

is happening [words indistinct] Angolan drama, no observer seems able to realize that Angola is burning.

Thousands of men are facing the worst carnage ever recorded in African history. Economic, political, intellectual, and moral life have been brutally halted by the warmongering actions of an usurper, Dr. Savimbi.

Despite Angola's (?alarming) situation, one can still see that the observers' troika remains openly and politically complacent toward Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola [UNITA]. Absurd though it may seem, recognition of the Republic of Angola by the U.S. Administration continues to hinge on an eventual understanding between the government and the Savimbist wing, which rendered dialogue unfeasible when it tried to annul the people's wishes by taking up arms.

The most shocking thing of all is to discover that (?U.S. diplomacy) only works (?in clear favor of) Dr. Savimbi [words indistinct] the EEC's labyrinthine bureaucratic apparatus, which is still dithering over the adoption of concrete measures able to renew the government's military capability, which has been seriously impaired by the continued implementation of the famous Triple Zero clause. With regard to the Angolan dossier, Russia has played a notable role at Security Council meetings. Unfortunately, most of those resolutions end up in the archives.

It is for that reason that it is believed that true democrats would support that country, were it to use its military funds to exert pressure on the countries which supply most weapons to declare a military embargo that would affect Dr. Savimbi's militarist wing from a logistical viewpoint. [sentence as heard]

Without such material assistance, we believe Dr. Savimbi will have no option but to respect the people's choice as reflected by the results of the 29-30 September 1992 elections.

In light of the example given by the United Nations, the troika should adopt a single diplomatic line with regard to those who want to use force for a political takeover of Angola. It is unjust to continue to [words indistinct] the same measure in assessing the government's and Savimbist UNITA's performance. Furthermore, it is immoral to put the defense of economic interests before the country's most important source of wealth, the Angolan people.

Having worked hard at mediation, the troika should now be at the head of those who think that, in view of constant violations of the principal clauses of the Bicesse Accords, the international community should take appropriate measures to help the Angolan Government and the Angolan people achieve peace without any delay: to disarm and confine UNITA's militarist wing troops;

and take humanitarian aid to all areas which have suffered violent occupation by the UNITA (?military wing). These are indispensable prerequisites for reviving Angola's internal pacification process.

#### **Radio Notes Disbandment of Buffalo Battalion**

*MB2603094893 Luanda Radio Nacional Network in Portuguese 0600 GMT 26 Mar 93*

[Text] South Africa's Buffalo Battalion, consisting mainly of Angolans, will be disbanded today and thereafter integrated into various units. The participation of Buffalo Battalion personnel in renewed fighting in Angola alongside the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola [UNITA] and in the incidents at Phola Park township, an African National Congress [ANC] stronghold, led President Frederick de Klerk to disband the Buffalo Battalion.

The South African Government says the battalion consists of less than 10 percent South Africans and by Angolans who opted for South African nationality after leaving Angola as refugees. Reports say that during South African invasions of Angola, South African Colonel Jan Breytenbach trained the battalion which the ANC says is formed by foreign mercenaries who were brought together within the context of the policy of apartheid and destabilization of neighboring countries.

#### **Port Authorities Impound Ships Carrying Cargo for Zaire**

*MB2603093193 Luanda TPA Television Network in Portuguese 1930 GMT 25 Mar 93*

[Text] Two ships, an Angolan and a foreign one, carrying assorted cargo were impounded by the Luanda port authorities on 18 March. The ships were about to leave for the Zairian Province of Lower Zaire, though permission had only been granted for them to sail to Cabinda.

Izidorio Dignos, a Filipino, was the captain of one of the ships which can carry up to 1,600 tonnes. The ship had been in the service of the Angolan Shipping Company since November 1992. Lunda, the other ship, is owned by an Angolan and its captain is Andre Prata. It had a crew of 12 and can carry 498 tonnes. Both ships had licenses to operate along the Angolan coast. The cargo of the ships consisted mainly of fuel, dried fish, zinc sheets, tires and even vehicles.

The head of the control department said that the captains of the ships, as well as a number of traders of unknown nationality are being interrogated by the economics branch of the Angolan police. He said that the activities carried out by the two ships undermine Angola's economy, particularly at a time when a large number of displaced persons needs urgent assistance.

[Begin unidentified Control Department head recording]  
This type of action is bleeding the Angolan economy and is an affront to our people who are the victims of war. As you know, there are displaced persons who live in

appalling conditions in Bengo and who die of famine in Benguela daily. So, one cannot see how people of bad faith and criminals of such a nature can divert merchandise that has cost Angola dearly and send it to a country that in fact is hostile to the Angolan people. [end recording]

#### **Lesotho**

#### **Government Orders Release of Prisoners on Election Eve**

*MB2603084093 Maseru Radio Lesotho in English 0500 GMT 26 Mar 93*

[Text] The government of Lesotho has, on the occasion of the holding of the general elections and return to civilian rule, ordered the immediate release of 225 convicted prisoners throughout Lesotho prisons. Other prisoners will be released on subsequent dates following the remission of their sentences.

The 225 prisoners include those whose terms of imprisonment would be completed in June this year, prisoners who were convicted of minor offenses, and others will be released on parole conditions.

It has always been government's policy to promote rehabilitation programs and train inmates to acquire skills in various industrial activities. It is therefore the government's hope that the released prisoners, with their acquired skills, will play a constructive role in society and engage themselves in developmental activities in their communities.

#### **Mozambique**

#### **Renamo Official Denies Reports on Resumption of War**

*MB2603095093 Maputo Radio Mozambique Network in Portuguese 0900 GMT 26 Mar 93*

[Text] Youssouf Ismael, Mozambique National Resistance's [Renamo] representative in the city of Tete who claims to have attended all the restricted meetings held after the Maringue news conference, says he did not hear anything about a resumption of the war in the country. He was reacting to reports disseminated by the BBC, according to which Renamo had instructed its military commanders to be ready for a possible resumption of the war in Mozambique.

Meanwhile, our Tete correspondent reports that Renamo is planning to hold a rally in that city.

### **Renamo Introduces 500 Troops Into Niassa**

*MB2503150393 Maputo Radio Mozambique Network in Portuguese 1030 GMT 25 Mar 93*

[Text] Lieutenant Colonel Horacio Majane, Niassa provincial military commander, has accused the Mozambique National Resistance [Renamo] of introducing 500 armed men in the province from Zambezia Province. According to the commander, one of the military units is stationed [words indistinct] in Maua District. Lt. Col. Horacio Majane said Renamo's attitude constitutes a violation of the General Peace Accord signed in Rome. In an interview with Radio Mozambique in Lichinga, Niassa Province, the provincial military commander said there has been a strange movement of men in urban areas and some districts over the past few days. He said it is believed that these men belong to Renamo's reconnaissance mission.

### **Namibia**

#### **Nujoma Pardons 575 Prisoners on Independence Anniversary**

*MB2503211893 Windhoek Namibian Broadcasting Corporation Network in English 1900 GMT 25 Mar 93*

[Text] Two hundred and thirty seven were released from Windhoek Central Prison today in line with the presidential pardon. Speaking on behalf of President Sam Nujoma, Home Affairs Deputy Minister Nangolo Ithethi said this humanitarian gesture should not be seen as a sign of weakness on the part of the government.

He said the state president's humane gesture was based on the government's policy of respect for human dignity and the fundamental right to liberty. He expressed the hope that this (?meeting) of the ex-prisoners benefited from training courses in trades such as carpentry, mechanics, and [words indistinct] during their imprisonment, and will utilize their skills to the benefit of their families and the nation as a whole. President Sam Nujoma announced a countrywide pardon of 575 prisoners in (?70) categories on the occasion of Namibia's third independence anniversary.

### **Zambia**

#### **Doctors To Examine Detainees Amid Torture Claims**

*AB2603100393 Paris AFP in English 0225 GMT 26 Mar 93*

[Text] Lusaka, March 25 (AFP)—The Zambian government has hired independent doctors to examine allegedly tortured opposition figures detained in connection

with a plot to oust the government of President Fredrick Chiluba, a government spokesman told AFP Thursday [25 March].

The spokesman denied that there was a rift in the Chiluba cabinet over the torture claims following a call by Legal Affairs Minister, Rodger Chongwe, on Monday that authorities should dismiss interrogating officers if found torturing prisoners.

"No ministers have differed on the issue of the alleged torture of the detainees and the Cabinet has not even met to discuss the claim. It is you press going all out magnifying the issue," said the spokesman Richard Sakala.

He said Chiluba had given instructions for the detainees to be examined by independent doctors and so far medical reports on those who have been examined indicated that they have not been tortured.

Home Affairs Minister Newstead Zimba, who has consistently denied the torture allegation, described Chongwe's comment as "an overreaction."

Four UNIP [United National Independence Party] figures detained in Lusaka, paraded before the press on Wednesday, all denied having been tortured. Cuthbert Ng'uni and former Commerce and Industry Minister Rabison Chongo, the allegedly worst tortured, refused to appear however raising doubt over their claims.

"If they were really tortured, they should have been the most enthusiastic to show their torture marks," commented one government official who accompanied Mwanawasa.

### **Zimbabwe**

#### **Defense Ministry To Reduce Army by 40 Percent**

*MB2503135793 Johannesburg Channel Africa Radio in English 1100 GMT 25 Mar 93*

[Text] Zimbabwe plans to reduce its army by just 40 percent in the next few years as part of efforts to reduce government spending under international pressure to do so. The FINANCIAL GAZETTE newspaper quotes official sources as saying that the government will reduce the 75,000-strong army, one of the largest in Africa, in several phases to form into a smaller elite force. The Zimbabwean defense minister, Moven Mahachi, confirmed that his ministry was considering reductions, but declined to give any details.

## Ghana

### Government Denies 'Involvement in Togolese Affairs'

*AB2503195093 Accra Ghana Broadcasting Corporation Radio Network in English 1900 GMT 25 Mar 93*

[Text] The Government of Ghana has deplored the attempt to implicate the country in the recent incident involving an attack on the military camp in Lome where President Eyadema stays. An official statement in Accra this evening said the Togolese authorities have developed a subversion psychosis in relation to Ghana and are therefore inclined automatically to implicate Ghana in any incident in Togo. Ghana wishes to caution the Togolese authorities against reckless accusations which merely have the effect of heightening tension between the two countries.

The statement said in messages delivered to President Rawlings by Togolese delegations on the 29th of December last year and the 16th of this month, President Eyadema accused the Togolese opposition of training people in Ghana in order to attack Togo, and also that the opposition was planning to sabotage clinics, schools, and other institutions in Ghana and to blame these on the Togolese Armed Forces in order to provoke Ghana to attack Togo.

On both occasions, no specific facts were divulged to substantiate the allegations and to facilitate investigations. Nevertheless, Ghana undertook to investigate these reports, a process which until now had not yielded any positive results on the basis of which action could be taken.

The government said in keeping with her international obligations Ghana does not, and will not allow her territory to be the basis of subversion against her neighbors. The Government of Ghana denies any involvement in Togolese affairs and calls upon the Togolese authorities to appreciate that the cause of such incidents as have taken place lies in their refusal to face realities and to appreciate that the only way such desperate acts can be avoided is to put in place a credible program for return to constitutional democracy. In this exercise, the Government of Ghana is willing to lend a helping hand.

Meanwhile, Togo has closed her borders with Ghana and Benin.

### Foreign Minister Comments

*AB2503165793 London BBC World Service in English 1515 GMT 25 Mar 93*

[Telephone interview with Foreign Minister Obed Asamoah in Accra by Josephine Hazely in BBC studios, London on 25 March—recorded; from the "Focus on Africa" program]

[Text] [Asamoah] It is a habit with Togolese authorities—if they are the people you are talking about—

anytime something happens in Togo, then they look for scapegoats. They do not want to look at the realities of their situation and to see to the extent that they continue to have the political impact that they have that these incidents can occur. [as heard]

[Hazely] But, I mean, after all, you do have troops on your border.

[Asamoah] Yes, we do, but our troops are not involved in any acts of attack on Togo. That is not possible.

[Hazely] Why not?

[Asamoah] Because that is not what they are there for. They are there to defend Ghana and to protect our borders, but they are not there to attack Togo, and we have said over and over again that Ghana has no intention of attacking Togo.

[Hazely] Okay, you say Ghana as a government is not responsible for the attack, but could it be that opposition forces within Ghana could have been behind it?

[Asamoah] Well, I cannot, you know, certify that; I mean, I cannot really tell. This is something that will have to be, you know, determined as the events unfold and as more facts come out.

[Hazely] Does that mean you may enquire into this?

[Asamoah] Oh, certainly we will. I mean if we get specific information about the involvement of the opposition who are in Ghana, certainly we will investigate and take appropriate action.

[Hazely] They are also claiming that there is a clandestine radio, which announced the attack and this radio is based in your country, Ghana. Is that the case?

[Asamoah] I am not aware of that.

[Hazely] You would not know if there was a radio station operating on your soil?

[Asamoah] I would not know, no.

[Hazely] You would not?

[Asamoah] No, how would I?

[Hazely] Surely, your security people would have told you about it?

[Asamoah] Well, I mean yes, but so far, no security person has told me that there is any such radio station.

### Togolese Refugee Representative Says Influx Increasing

*AB2503204093 Accra Ghana Broadcasting Corporation Radio Network in English 0600 GMT 25 Mar 93*

[Text] The influx of Togolese refugees into Ghana is on the increase. At the moment, there are over 150,000 refugees in the country. This was disclosed by the acting

president of Act Now, a nongovernmental organization and representative body of the Togolese refugees in Ghana, Mr. Cornelius Aidam, at a news conference in Accra yesterday. He said the organization acts as a relief body and caters for refugees. Mr. Aidam said the body will cooperate with other international organizations engaged in similar activities.

### President Rawlings Swears In State, Regional Ministers

AB2403163393 Paris AFP in English 0208 GMT  
24 Mar 93

[Text] Accra, March 23 (AFP) - President Jerry Rawlings on Tuesday [23 March] swore in the 34 ministers approved by Parliament.

The full list of ministers is:

	State Ministers:
- Finance and Economic planning:	Kwesi Botchwey
- Defense:	Alhaji Mahama Iddrisu
- Foreign Affairs:	Obed Asamoah
- Interior:	Lt.-Col. Emmanuel Osei-Wusu
- Attorney general and Justice:	Anthony Forson
- Food and Agriculture:	Ibrahim Adam
- Mines and Energy:	Kwame Peprah
- Education:	Harry Sawyer
- Health:	Commandant Steve Obimpeh
- Trade and Industry:	Emma Mitchell
- Transport and Communications:	Edward Salia
- Parliamentary Affairs:	Joseph Owusu Acheampong
- Science and Technology:	Kofi Akosa
- Environment:	Christina Amoako-Nuama
- Works and Housing:	Kwasi Sowu
- Roads and Highways:	Ato Quarshie
- Lands and Forestry:	David Amankwa
- Tourism:	Stephen Ayidiya
- Labour:	David Boateng
- Information:	Kofi Totobi Quayyi
- Local Government and Rural Development:	Kwamena Ahwoi
	State Ministers without portfolio:
	- Alhaji Fuseni
	- Mrs Vida yeboah
	- Godfrey Abulu
	- Kobena Fosu
	- Alhaji Amidu Sulemana
	Regional Ministers:
- Greater Accra:	Mike Gizo

- Northern region:	Lt.-Col. Abdulai Ibrahim
- Upper East region:	Sherif Gumah
- Eastern region:	Kofi Peprah
- Western region:	John Abu
- Central region:	John Ekuban
- Brong-Ahafo region:	Isaac Adjei-Mensah
- Ashanti region:	Daniel Agyekum

### Liberia

#### ULIMO Accepts Sawyer Invitation To Join Government

AB2503213593 Paris AFP in English 1920 GMT  
25 Mar 93

[Excerpt] Freetown, March 25 (AFP) - The United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO, one of the Liberian armed factions) Thursday [25 March] accepted an offer by Liberian interim President Amos Sawyer to return to Monrovia to "take part in the government and bring lasting peace to troubled Liberia."

Sawyer made the offer at a meeting with ULIMO political wing leader Raleigh Seekie during a one day visit to Freetown.

Accepting the proposal, Seekie said his movement had been waiting for the invitation for over two and a half years.

The Liberian president said his government "is genuinely looking to forge an agenda with the leadership of ULIMO". [passage omitted]

#### AFL, ULIMO Reportedly 'Slaughter' Harbel Civilians

AB2503122593 Gbarnga Radio ELBC in English 0700 GMT 25 Mar 93

[Text] Reports reaching LBS [Liberian Broadcasting System] news have confirmed that there has been a massive slaughtering of civilians in the Harbel area by the AFL [Armed Forces of Liberia], ULIMO [United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia], and black berets. According to the report, ECOMOG [Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group] allowed AFL and ULIMO bandits to slaughter both men and women, including pregnant ones, while babies were slaughtered by smashing them against the wall.

[Gbarnga Radio ELBC in English adds in the same newscast: "It has been revealed that a local Catholic priest, Reverend Jerry Nangbeh, was among hundreds of people killed by the joint forces of ECOMOG, ULIMO, AFL, and the black berets in the [name indistinct] area, in Harbel. The Catholic priest is reported to have been chained and (?shot) by ECOMOG and ULIMO forces in

the Harbel area. Reports say the incident has been brought to the attention of the Catholic archbishop in Monrovia, Michael Francis, and he is said to be embarrassed since the incident involves ECOMOG; AFL, and ULIMO he backs."]

[Gbarnga Radio ELBC in English at 1900 GMT on 24 March reports: "Citizens and residents of Greenville, in Sino County, have reiterated their appeal to the United Nations and the United States Government to put a complete halt to the continued senseless and indiscriminate bombing of civilian quarters in greater Liberia by the Nigerian-led military occupation force. Our reporter who just returned from Greenville says three Nigerian Alpha jet bombers last week indiscriminately raided the city, killing 70 persons, including the Grand Memorial Hospital administrator, Dr. David Thorn and seriously wounding several others. Our reporter said the air raid on Greenville, which lasted for about 25 minutes, saw school children, church-goers, hospital staff, and marketeers being gunned down by the Nigerian killers."]

#### Taylor Expresses 'Outrage' Over ECOMOG 'Barbarism'

*AB2403133093 Gbarnga Radio ELBC in English 1900 GMT 23 Mar 93*

[Text] President Charles Gankay Taylor has expressed outrage over ECOMOG's [Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group] continuous acts of barbarism and mayhem against the people of Liberia. He said ECOMOG continues to kill large numbers of innocent Liberians in market places, hospitals, and other civilian quarters without condemnation from the international community. President Taylor said had it been the NPFL [National Patriotic Front of Liberia] carrying out bombing raids in Monrovia, some powerful nations and influential individuals could have been lobbying for him to be charged with war crimes. The president said ECOMOG is massacring the Liberian people, yet no one is charging ECOMOG of war crimes. The president told a visiting foreign journalist that he has the ability to equally bomb Monrovia, but has chosen to advise citizens to move to safety zones in order not to endanger their lives because he will equally have to live with them in the future. President Taylor said many Liberians in Greater Liberia seem to be vexed with this approach when they see ECOMOG indiscriminately bombing and killing innocent Liberians without (forewarning). The president said this is a strategy being used by ECOMOG to provoke him to open artillery into Monrovia as an excuse for some people to lobby for war crimes against the NPRA [National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly] government, saying ECOMOG is doing it, yet no one is charging them with war crimes.

In another development, President Taylor has expressed shock over the account of the Liberian situation by Ambassador Gordon-Somers. He said Ambassador Gordon-Somers misled UN Secretary General Dr. Butrus

Butrus-Ghali over developments in Liberia. The president said Gordon-Somers did not make any mention of ECOMOG's bombing in Greater Liberia and deceived the UN secretary general that there were several warehouses owned by humanitarian organizations catering to the needs of citizens in Greater Liberia.

#### Nigeria

##### Shonekan Describes 'Positive,' 'Fruitful' U.S. Visit

*AB2503214693 Lagos NTA Television Network in English 2000 GMT 24 Mar 93*

[Text] The head of government and chairman of the Transitional Council, Chief Ernest Shonekan, has described the outcome of his trip to the United States as positive. He was speaking today in Washington with media executives. State House correspondent Mohamed Kudu Abubakar filed this report from Washington:

[Begin Abubakar recording] While describing his visit to the United States as fruitful, Chief Ernest Shonekan told the Washington media executives that his talks with the U.S. vice president, Mr. Albert Gore, the commerce secretary, the treasury secretary, and the deputy secretary of state to the United States [as heard] were very positive.

The head of government stated that the vice president, Mr. Albert Gore, showed understanding on the developments in Nigeria, particularly on the economy and political transition program. The Clinton Administration officials, Chief Shonekan revealed, have also offered to assist Nigeria in its bid for debt relief on the Enhanced (?Trading) Terms on more U.S. investments in Nigeria and also to assist to resolve the Liberian crisis.

U.S. officials have also agreed for a joint Nigeria-United States initiative to combat drug trafficking. Chief Shonekan also disclosed today that his talks to officials of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the International Finance Corporation were also positive. To this end, a joint IMF-World Bank team will visit Nigeria in April this year to ascertain the extent of economic development with the view to approving Nigeria's bid for debt relief.

Following the head of government, the foreign secretary, Chief Matthew Mbu, the petroleum secretary, Chief Philip Asiodu, and Attorney General Mr. Clement Akpamgbo, SAN [Senior Advocate of Nigeria], took turns to inform the Washington media executives on developments in Nigeria. They explained the transition program so far, but particularly the wisdom of Option A4, the economic situation, the Liberian crisis, and the issue of Nigeria's image abroad, particularly in the United States. Chief Shonekan urged the American press to desist from indexing Nigeria as a country whenever a Nigerian commits a crime. He stated as unfair the negative publicity against Nigeria since, according to

him, close to half a million Nigerians are at present working and residing in the United States, making substantial contribution to the development of the American society. [end recording]

**Group Warns of 'Upheaval' if Fuel Prices Raised**  
*AB2503205993 London BBC World Service in English 1830 GMT 23 Mar 93*

[From the "Focus on Africa" program]

[Text] Amid warnings of a major rise in the price of fuel, always a controversial issue in Nigeria, a human rights group, Campaign for Democracy, has warned of a potentially calamitous upheaval. The warning comes in a letter from the Campaign for Democracy to Ernest Shonekan who heads the civilian Transitional Council but reports to Nigeria's military rulers. Tensions in Nigeria are even higher than usual in the run up to next weekend's conventions, when the two political parties are due to choose their presidential candidates. On the line to Lagos, Akwe Amosu asked the Campaign for Democracy's chairman, Bekoe Ransome-Kuti what the Campaign for Democracy's letter had said.

[Begin recording] [Ransome-Kuti] The thrust of our letter is the sudden single-mindedness with which they are pursuing the increase in prices in petrol and related products and we know it is going to cause a lot of trouble and we are also wondering why he has done nothing about all the promises he made in his budget speech about accountability, open government, the stoppage of extra budgetary spending, and all sorts of mismanagement. He himself promised that prices would not be raised until a consensus was reached. He has not talked to anybody, there has been no meeting. The only consensus that seems to be in the country is that the prices should not be raised.

[Amosu] Now, you said in this letter that you thought that the situation was potentially calamitous. What did you mean by that?

[Ransome-Kuti] Well, as of now there is a lot of tension in the country, there is ethno-religious conflicts and disagreements. These funny elections are going on; nobody knows what plan General Babangida has up his sleeve, whether the elections are going to succeed, I mean everybody is just on tenterhooks. I think there are two major points: the first is the increase in petroleum, the second is if Gen. Babangida now postpones his going again. These are the two major points that can spark anything off.

[Amosu] And when you say spark something off, you mean riots in the streets, you mean demonstrations, you mean strikes? What exactly?

[Ransome-Kuti] Well, strikes to start with, and...I don't know, anything, but I am sure that the last time they raised the cost of petrol just by about 2 kobos, there were lots of strikes all over the country, and hundreds of

people were killed. So if as they are now planning to do it, to raise it about five times over, I just cannot imagine what can happen.

[Amosu] And if there was such civil strife you think that perhaps President Babangida would use that as an excuse not to leave power in August as he has promised?

[Ransome-Kuti] We think that is one of his strategies, but whether it will serve that purpose is a different matter, because I think many people are now resolved that he should not..[changes thought] under no circumstance should he stay after that.

[Amosu] Is it possible that by viewing events in such a conspiratorial manner you are, as it were, adding to the increase in tension. I mean could it not just be that every country has to raise petrol prices and could it not just be that this election process is rolling along as it should?

[Ransome-Kuti] But we are in contact with the parties and they are not happy about the way things are going. They themselves are very apprehensive, and it is not a matter of viewing it in a conspiratorial way. These are facts we are putting down. And then are we not entitled to ask, to have any say in our own lives? And any time we make any suggestions, any complaints, we seem to be the ones who are disturbing him.

[Amosu] On previous occasions when you have spoken out like this you have been arrested and you have been mistreated in jail. You have been held for quite a long period, in fact, without trial. Are you not worried about doing this again?

[Ransome-Kuti, laughing] Well, there is no option. We just cannot sit down. You see, if we do not talk, they will say, well, he was there, he did not say anything; that all of you agreed, you did not complain at the time. But at least we should complain. [end recording]

**Togo**

**Communiqué Announces Attack by 'Foreign Forces'**

*AB2503153793 Kara Radio Kara in French 1352 GMT 25 Mar 93*

[Text] Ladies and gentlemen, especially on account of current events, we are interrupting this music for your pleasure to remind you that calm has returned to Lome after the deafening gunfire that took place in some districts of the capital from 0230 to 0515 this morning. The Armed Forces have the situation under control. They succeeded in repulsing an attack by foreign forces. This attack was launched on the Tokoin Military Camp in Lome. We also promised to broadcast the integral text of a communiqué from the Ministry of National Defense. Well, we now have the communiqué, which Defense Minister Inoussa Bouraima will read to you:

**[Begin recording]** At 0300 on 25 March, a commando group armed with heavy weaponry, including rocket launchers, attacked the Lome, Tokoin Interarms Camp. The commando attacks were focused on precise targets. In the face of a prompt reaction by the security forces, the group was routed and (?forced) to withdraw.

Because calm had returned to the capital, there is no doubt that the terrorist aggression of this night was aimed at causing panic among the peaceful population of Lome and preventing workers—some of whom have returned from involuntary exile—from going to their workplaces. We deplore the death of General Mawulikplimi Ameji, personal chief of staff to the president of the Republic, as well as the wounding of a soldier. No civilian victims were reported. The population of the capital and all the Togolese people are recommended to remain calm and vigilant and go freely about their duties.

Investigations into the causes of this external aggression are being conducted.

There is no doubt that this aggression was aimed at neutralizing the ceaseless efforts of the crisis government to find concrete solutions to the concerns of the population and successfully conclude the democratic process in our country. [end recording]

Issued in Lome on 25 March.

### Curfew Imposed

*AB2603080593 Paris AFP in English 2257 GMT  
25 Mar 93*

**[Text]** Lome, March 25 (AFP)—Officials Thursday [25 March] night imposed a dusk to dawn curfew, as it emerged that the country's deputy armed forces chief had been killed in a failed attack on Togo's leader General Gnassingbe Eyadema.

The president himself was unharmed in the attack overnight Wednesday, carried out by an unknown number of assailants who penetrated the military base in the Tokoin district in northern Lome Wednesday night.

Early in the day officials said that the general's personal military chief of staff, General Mawulikplimi Ameji, was killed in the attack, and that another military aide had been injured.

Some 15 hours after the attack the defence minister, Inoussa Bouraima, said that the armed forces deputy chief of staff, Colonel Koffi Tepe, had also been killed in the attack. He declined to give any details of how he had died, or to explain why the announcement had been delayed.

The curfew imposed Thursday would last from 7 p.m. Thursday until 6:00 a.m. Friday, a government statement reported on state radio said.

Eyadema met senior government officials during the day Thursday and was in good health, officials said. During the attack a rocket was reported to have landed next to his bed.

Although no official announcement was made, sources said the country's borders with Benin and Ghana were closed Thursday. An Air Afrique plane due to land in Lome Thursday afternoon was diverted to the Benin capital Cotonou.

### Olympio Denies Involvement in Lome Incidents

*AB2503181493 London BBC World Service in English  
1705 GMT 25 Mar 93*

[From the "Focus on Africa" program]

**[Text]** The Togo opposition and the trade unions are bound to fall under some suspicion. They have been at loggerheads with President Eyadema and with interim Prime Minister Kokou Koffigoh. They have been running a general strike for months, and they have recently put up their own candidate for prime minister. And one opposition member who usually gets some blame is Gilchrist Olympio. He is in England at the moment, and Robin White called him up and asked if he could shed any light on the events in Lome.

**[Begin recording]** [Olympio] Well, all that I can say is that what happened since last night is not the policy of the democratic opposition in Togo. There are, however, two theories, and we should know more about the exact position by evening today: One is that the whole thing is a put-up story by the president himself in order to take drastic action against some of the opposition people still in the country, and also to bring a little more discipline into his own troops. The second one is that there is a serious faction against the president in the country, and there was serious fighting that broke out at 0300 last night. Now, whether any of these theories is true we do not quite know at this stage, but there is more and more information coming through, and we will have a clearer picture by tonight.

[White] You have been talking to Togo today?

[Olympio] Yes, I did. I talked to Togo a few times, and people called me back a few times from Togo.

[White] And what did they say? Did they say there was a lot of tension?

[Olympio] There is a lot of tension. The streets are all empty. The shops are closed down, the flow of population out of the country has gone worse since this morning, and the population on the other side of the frontier—the refugees—are all in a jittery position because they fear there might be commando action—reprisals—from the president of Togo. So, that is roughly the situation at this time.

[White] But you are insisting that this has got nothing to do with you?

[Olympio] Oh, I know that for sure. [laughs] Not only with me, but I am also sure not with the other members of COD [Coordinating Committee of the Democratic Opposition], which is the democratic opposition of Togo.

[White] But you would say that, wouldn't you?

[Olympio] Well, what else do you want me to say? I fear that it is not the work of the opposition, I really wish it is not, and I hope Eyadema is not doing all these things in order to bring more reprisals and bloodshed into the country. They have suffered a lot in the last few months.  
[end recording]

**Commentary Condemns Opposition Prime Minister**

AB2503223293 Kara Radio Kara in French 1300 GMT  
24 Mar 93

[Commentary by Yacobi Tchetchibara]

[Text] On the refusal of the right for democracy: At a meeting in Cotonou on 22 March, the Collective of the Democratic Opposition-II proposed a prime minister to President Soglo. One cannot blame President Soglo, the chairman of the Economic Community of West African States, for having sadly ridiculed himself by showing a sense of irresponsibility in breaking the harmony of good neighborliness and trampling on the universal principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of a sister country.

As president of a sovereign state, he has, in his country Benin, the sovereign right to commit all the stupidity he wants. One can only blame the Togolese politicians for carrying their meanness and mediocrity across the world. These Togolese think they can resolve the current crisis by making it more complicated. Indeed, in Togo under democratic transition, that is not the first inconsistency. But we baffle logical minds most by demanding legality in everything and at the same time indulging in completely unlawful actions.

Thus, in the name of the right to strike, as written in the Constitution, some Togolese political leaders and trade union leaders, are violently preventing Togolese citizens from their right to work and therefore the right to eat. Thus, while the head of state is being accused of violating the Constitution, some Togolese politicians, who have no national responsibilities, have assumed the right to impose on Togo a prime minister who is alleged to have been elected democratically, but who was elected by friends who are apparently feeling in their golden exile. But the most unacceptable of all these tragic mistakes is the contempt for the law by even its most senior custodians.

Yes, in Togo under the democratic transition, magistrates are on strike because some of them are party activists at a time when we are all called upon to make the apprenticeship of the independence of the judiciary so that justice can really become the third

power of the state for the restoration of a state that truly subscribes to the rule of law. That is why we are saying, repeating, and reaffirming that our strike is the denial of a right and that the Togolese nation and Republic are in real danger. This is so because when justice is politicized, with politicians involved, there is really no justice and the citizen no longer has any recourse for the protection of his rights in a state that subscribes to the rule of law, unless after the unlimited strike, our magistrates proclaim their political neutrality in accordance with Article 118 of the Constitution. Short of that, the third power of the state will be a power to be feared.

**Political Group Expresses Support for Koffigoh**

AB2303171693 Lome Radio Lome in French 2200  
GMT 22 Mar 93

[Statement issued by the New Forces for Responsible Democracy in Lome on 22 March—read by Marshal Denu]

[Text] Following the 18 March statement and as usual, in light of our country's political developments, the New Forces National Coordinating Committee wants to tell the Togolese people the following:

1. In their determination to introduce democracy, the Togolese people held a sovereign national conference, after which a prime minister was democratically elected to conduct the democratic transition until elections are held. This prime minister was asked to do everything possible to bring all the Togolese people together despite their diversity in order to achieve national reconciliation.
2. Today, the New Forces National Coordinating Committee has observed that despite the enormous difficulties that Togo faced during this transitional period, Prime Minister Koffigoh has remained loyal to the responsibility assigned to him by the Togolese people.
3. The coordinating committee also wants all Togolese to bear witness to the fact that the people have never charged any political party or a group of political parties with censoring the government's policies. In this regard the New Forces note with certitude that some political parties have been behaving like impostors. Without waiting for the elections, and regularly, these political parties give taken certain rights for themselves through mind-poisoning, manipulation, and lies. Such attitudes by some political party leaders concerned about electoral publicity, plunges the already-tired Togolese people into a difficult and desperate situations. These attitudes even go as far as dangerously manipulating one of the transitional organs, namely the High Council of the Republic [HCR], thus preventing its president from playing the role of a moderator which he had to play during the transition. This constitutes a serious disregard for our democracy and lack of respect for the people's sovereignty.

4. The New Forces want to make it clear that destabilizing the prime minister has never been a mission

assigned to the HCR. Similarly, the attempt to dismiss him cannot replace the program of the political parties.

5. In view of the foregoing, the New Forces National Coordinating Committee appeals to all Togolese men and women to firmly say no to all those who want to turn our cause for democracy into an adventure that seeks to exclude a portion of the Togolese people—an adventure of unavowed ambitions, of settling scores, and of manipulation—which is harmful to the nation's future.

At present, it requests all the sons of this country to demonstrate, with a democratic and patriotic pride, their maturity in assuming their responsibility in a spirit of brotherhood and generosity.

6. The New Forces National Coordinating Committee solemnly reaffirms its support for the only legitimate prime minister of Togo, Kokou Joseph Koffigoh.

7. The New Forces National Coordinating Committee congratulates the crisis government for the selfless work it has done to give the nation confidence, security, and

the means that will enable Togo to rapidly organize free and democratic elections, which only can turn our country into a real law-abiding state.

8. While it appeals to all truth- and wisdom-loving Togolese to do away with all complexes and fears in order to build the new democratic country by rallying behind their prime minister, the New Forces wish to assert that Togolese politics can only be decided in Togo with respect for our independence which was dearly attained. The future of Togo cannot in any way be decided in a foreign capital, be it in Africa or any other place outside our sovereign country.

9. Finally, the New Forces National Coordinating Committee urges the prime minister to remain calm and confident in the path of salvation for the people, based on his policy of integration of all factions and holding permanent consultation with the other political authorities of the country.

Issued in Lome on 22 March.

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